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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jason Godwin appeals from his Judgment of Conviction. Following a jury trial, he was
convicted of the second degree murder of Kyle Anderson. On appeal, he raises six issues.
First, Mr. Godwin asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In an
issue of first impression, Mr. Godwin asserts his voluntary questioning become a custodial
interrogation, requiring Miranda warnings, after his first confession to killing Mr. Anderson.
Mr. Godwin was eventually given Miranda warnings, but these delayed warning did not cure the
Fifth Amendment violation. He argues this intentional ask first, warn later technique should
result in the suppression of his statements made after his first confession.
Next,  he  asserts  the  district  court  erred  in  prohibiting  the  admission  of  relevant  victim
character evidence, admitted through opinion or reputation testimony, unless Mr. Godwin was
able to prove he knew about Mr. Anderson’s reputation for violence and aggression.
Mr. Godwin asserts this Court should overrule or decline to follow State v. Custodio, 136
Idaho 197 (Ct. App. 2001). He asserts Custodio’s holding that specific instances of a victim’s
conduct are not admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 405(b) because a victim’s propensity
for violence or aggressiveness does not constitute an essential element of a self-defense claim
has proven unjust. He asserts Idaho should adopt a broader approach to Rule 405(b) and employ
a case-by-case analysis to determine whether specific act evidence is essential to a self-defense
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claim.
Furthermore, he asserts the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on justifiable
homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1) was fundamental error, essentially lowering the State’s burden
of proving the homicide was unlawful, the State committed prosecutorial misconduct which
deprived him of a fair trial, and the errors are not harmless or, alternatively, that the errors
amount to cumulative error, depriving him of his right to a fair trial.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On a June evening in 2014, Kyle Anderson was shot in the neck outside his motorhome
near Kooskia, Idaho. (Tr.,1 p.571, Ls.3–15, p.673, Ls.8–23, p.585, Ls.6–12.) He died from the
gunshot wound. (Tr., p.642, Ls.3–11.) Mr. Godwin’s vehicle was identified as leaving the scene,
and the police contacted him for questioning. (Tr., p.673, Ls.17–23, p.939, L.4–p.940, L.9,
p.940, L.24–p.941, L.11, p.942, L.7–p.943, L.2.) The next morning, Officer Hewson with the
Idaho County Sherriff’s Office questioned Mr. Godwin, and Mr. Godwin admitted to shooting
Mr. Anderson in response to Mr. Anderson pulling a gun on him. (See generally Tr., p.842, L.2–
p.848, L.10, p.850, L.13–p.851, L.8; State’s Exs. 68–69; see, e.g., Inter. Tr.,2 p.9, Ls.18–19.)
The State filed an Information charging Mr. Godwin with second degree murder.
(R., pp.55–56.) Mr. Godwin pled not guilty. (R., p.115.)
1 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as “Tr.,” contains the suppression motion
hearing, trial, and sentencing. The second transcript, which contains a status conference and final
pretrial hearing, is not cited herein. In the cited transcript, the internal pagination starts over after
the suppression motion hearing. As such, pages 1 to 183 of the electronic document correspond
with pages 1 to 183 of the suppression motion hearing, but pages 184 to 1422 of the electronic
document correspond to pages 1 to 1239 of the trial and sentencing hearing. Citations herein
refer to the internal pagination of the transcript.
2 Citations to the Interrogation Transcripts (“Inter. Tr.”) refer to the court-ordered compilation of
three  audio  recordings:  Exhibits  A,  B,  and  C.  Exhibit  A contains  the  original  recording  of  the
interrogation, separated into two audio files: “Jason a” and “Jason b.” Exhibits B and C contain
slowed-down versions of the audio recording’s disputed portion. (See App. Br., p.15 n.4.)
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Prior to trial, Mr. Godwin moved to suppress his confession. (R., pp.178–89.) He argued
his confession was involuntary and obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
(R., pp.184–89.) The State objected. (R., pp.362–70.) The district court held a hearing and later
denied the motion. (R., pp.388–95, 500–08.) The district court held Mr. Godwin’s confession
was voluntary and Mr. Godwin did not invoke his Miranda3 rights. (R., pp.502–05.)
Alternatively, the district court held Mr. Godwin was not in custody for Miranda purposes and
therefore was not entitled to the Miranda warnings. (R., pp.505–08.)
Also prior to trial, the State filed a Motion in Limine requesting the district court prohibit
proposed defense witnesses Brandon Fisher and Billy Ellenberg from testifying “about specific
instances of conduct showing that the deceased, Kyle Anderson, was violent and aggressive.”
(R., pp.544–47.) Each witness was expected to testify Mr. Anderson had pointed a gun at him.
(R., p.544.) Defense counsel requested the specific act evidence be admitted and also requested
the district court overrule State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197 (Ct. App. 2001). (Tr., p.482, L.4–
p.483, L.14.) The Court held specific instances of conduct were prohibited and “[e]vidence
purporting to show Kyle Anderson’s propensity to violence shall be presented only in the form
of reputation or opinion evidence.” (R., pp.700–01.)
The trial began on February 22, 2016. (R., pp.631–33.) Mr. Anderson’s girlfriend,
Amanda Jones, testified she was outside with Mr. Anderson when he was shot. (Tr., p.578, L.4–
p.585, L.12.) She explained she and Mr. Anderson lived in a motorhome parked in a turnout on
the side of the road. (Tr., p.571, Ls.3–19.) On the evening of June 9, Mr. Anderson was outside
putting a new license plate on their motorhome. (Tr., p.576, Ls.4–16, p.578, Ls.1–19.) Ms. Jones
went out to help him, and she noticed a gun was falling out of his waistband. (Tr., p.578, Ls.4–5,
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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p.568, L.20–p.569, L.3, p.604, Ls.3–5.) Mr. Anderson put the gun in the back pocket of his vest.
(Tr., p.579, L.8–p.580, L.15.) Mr. Anderson had the gun in his back pocket as Mr. Godwin
pulled up in his vehicle. (Tr., p.580, Ls.14–22.) Ms. Jones was directly behind Mr. Anderson.
(Tr., p.580, Ls.23–25.) She saw two other people in the vehicle: Carla Griner/Cutler in the
passenger seat and Ernie Ruiz in the back. (Tr., p.583, Ls.18–24.) A fourth person, Beau Lynch,
was  in  the  back  of  the  vehicle  as  well,  but  Ms.  Jones  did  not  see  him until  after  the  shooting.
(Tr., p.598, Ls.8–19.) Ms. Jones testified, shortly after Mr. Godwin drove up, he shot
Mr. Anderson from his vehicle. (Tr., p.585, Ls.6–12.) She denied Mr. Anderson had his gun in
his hand, but claimed, at different points in her testimony, he had a screwdriver, a license plate,
and nothing in his hand. (Tr., p.581, Ls.12–14, p.583, Ls.2–3, p.583, Ls.4–6.) A photograph of
the crime scene shows the screwdriver and license plate resting on the back bumper of the
motorhome. (Tr., p.836, L.22–p.837, L.13; State’s Ex. 26.) She also denied seeing Mr. Anderson
use methamphetamine the day of the shooting, the day before, or ever. (Tr., p.613, Ls.5–19.) She
testified she was with him the entire day before and the day of the shooting. (Tr., p.612, L.22–
p.623, L.4.)
Ms. Griner/Cutler did not testify, but Mr. Lynch and Mr. Ruiz did. Mr. Lynch initially
testified he did not see Mr. Anderson with a gun in his hand. (Tr., p.714, Ls.5–11, p.714, L.21–
p.715, L.2.) Later on in the trial, however, Mr. Godwin introduced Mr. Lynch’s statement to the
police  shortly  after  the  shooting.  Mr.  Lynch’s  story  to  the  police  changed  from  seeing
Mr. Anderson pull a gun and move towards Mr. Godwin, who was saying “don’t shoot, don’t do
it,” to not seeing a gun. (Tr., p.982, L.3–p.984, L.11, p.985, Ls.4–15, p.986, Ls.15–23, p.988,
L.1–p.989, L.9.) Mr. Ruiz denied seeing Mr. Anderson with a gun. (Tr., p.764, L.5–p.765, L.4,
p.767, Ls.1–8.)
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Dr. Glen Groben testified Mr. Anderson died from an intermediate range gunshot wound
to the neck. (Tr., p.642, Ls.3–11; State’s Ex. 58.) Dr. Groben also testified Mr. Anderson had a
“significant” amount of methamphetamine in his blood. (Tr., p.658, L.24–p.659, L.2, p.660,
Ls.2–8.) Dr. Groben opined Mr. Anderson would have ingested the methamphetamine “within
hours” of his death and was likely feeling the effects, such as aggression. (Tr., p.662, L.2–p.663,
L.6.) Additionally, the injuries to the back of Mr. Anderson’s body were not consistent with
Ms. Jones’s testimony that Mr. Anderson had his gun in his back pocket at the time of his death.
(Tr., p.640, L.24–p.641, L.12, p.654, L.22–p.657, L.19; State’s Exs. 35, 37, 38, 58.)
In  addition  to  other  witnesses  and  exhibits,  the  State  played  the  audio  recording  of
Mr. Godwin’s June 10 interrogation. (Tr., p.848, Ls.9–10, p.851, Ls.7–9; State’s Exs. 68, 69.)
Mr. Godwin testified in his defense. (Tr., p.1049, L.6–p.1115, L.18.) Consistent with his
June 10 confession, Mr. Godwin repeatedly testified he shot Mr. Anderson in response to him
pulling a gun on him. (Tr., p.1063, L.6–p.1065, L.5, p.1093, L.20–p.1094, L.4, p.1111, Ls.3–9.)
The jury found Mr. Godwin guilty as charged. (Tr., p.1186, L.8–1187, L.1; R., p.760.)
The district court sentenced him to twenty-five years, with fifteen years fixed. (Tr., p.1236, L.2–
12; R., p.843.) Mr. Godwin timely appealed. (R., pp.853–55.)
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Godwin’s motion to suppress?
II. Did  the  district  court  err  when  it  ruled  Mr.  Godwin  could  only  present  opinion  or
reputation evidence of Mr. Anderson’s violent and/or aggressive character after showing
that Mr. Godwin was aware of Mr. Anderson’s propensity for violence?
III. Should this Court overrule State v. Custodio and hold specific instances of a victim’s
conduct, showing a violent character, can be an essential element of a self-defense claim
and are admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 405?
IV. Did the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on justifiable homicide pursuant to
I.C. § 18-4009(1) amount to fundamental error?
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V. Did  the  State  violate  Mr.  Godwin’s  right  to  a  fair  trial  by  committing  prosecutorial
misconduct?
VI. Do the errors in Mr. Godwin’s case amount to cumulative error?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Godwin’s Motion To Suppress
A. Introduction
Mr. Godwin contends the district court erred by denying his suppression motion because
his statements made after his first confession were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
B. Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to
suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). Findings of fact are accepted “if supported
by substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The Court freely reviews the
district court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts. Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C. Statement Of Facts Relevant To The Interrogation
After Mr. Anderson was shot, law enforcement placed Mr. Godwin’s residence under
surveillance. (R., p.501.) Law enforcement observed, “it looked like someone had left the place
in a hurry.” (R., p.501; see also Tr., p.60, L.25–p.61, L.4, p.98, L.21–p.99, L.2.)
Officer Ulmer obtained Mr. Godwin’s cellphone number and called him around 2:30 a.m.
on June 10. (R., p.501; Tr., p.9, L.13–p.10, L.13.) He told Mr. Godwin he was trying to locate
him and he needed to visit with him. (Tr., p.10, Ls.14–16.) He did not tell him why. (R., p.501;
Tr., p.10, Ls.17–18.) Mr. Godwin first told Officer Ulmer that he was at home, but Officer Ulmer
told him that he was at his home and Mr. Godwin was not there. (R., p.501; Tr., p.10, L.19–p.11,
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L.1.) Mr. Godwin then told Officer Ulmer that he was in Dudley, Idaho. (R., p.501; Tr., p.15,
L.14–p.16, L.7.) The phone call ended with no arrangement for Mr. Godwin to meet Officer
Ulmer. (Tr., p.16, Ls.8–12.)
At  8:30  a.m.,  on  June  10,  Mr.  Godwin  called  Officer  Ulmer,  Officer  Ulmer  missed  the
call, and Officer Ulmer called him back. (R., p.501; Tr., p.11, Ls.14–20.) Mr. Godwin told
Officer Ulmer that he had been up since the first phone call and he wanted to know what was
going on in Kooskia and why Officer Ulmer wanted to talk to him. (Tr., p.11, Ls.19–22.) Officer
Ulmer did not tell Mr. Godwin why he wanted to talk to him, but told him he would explain it
face-to-face. (Tr., p.11, L.23–p.12, L.1.) Mr. Godwin told Officer Ulmer he would be in Kooskia
in an hour and would go to the sheriff’s office. (Tr., p.12, Ls.3–6.)
About one hour later, Mr. Godwin arrived outside the sheriff’s office. (R., p.501.) Officer
Johnson happened to arrive there at the same time. (Tr., p.31, L.15–p.16, L.4.) Officer Johnson
contacted Mr. Godwin, and Mr. Godwin again asked why the police wanted to talk to him.
(Tr., p.33, L.16–p.34, L.3.) Officer Johnson told him “there had been a homicide the previous
night, and there were some indications that he might possibly have been involved in some way.”
(Tr., p.34, Ls.3–6.) He led Mr. Godwin into the sheriff’s office and directed Officer Hewson to
question him. (Tr., p.35, Ls.4–10, p.37, Ls.15–21, p.56, Ls.14–25, p.99, Ls.17–25.) The
conference room was at the back of the sheriff’s office, through a shared office for the deputies
and past several individual offices for other officers. (Tr., p.57, Ls.4–15.) It was about 20 feet
long by 10 or 15 feet wide with one door and no outside windows. (Tr., p.57, L.24–p.25, L.11.)
One interior window, with the blinds closed, faced the main area with the deputies’ shared office.
(Tr., p.58, Ls.11–14, p.130, Ls.1–3.) Officer Johnson asked Officer Hewson “to see what Jason
Godwin had to say about his whereabouts during the previous 24 hours or so.” (Tr., p.38, Ls.2–
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4.) Mr. Godwin was their primary and only suspect for the homicide. (Tr., p.28, L.20–p.29, L.2,
p.35, Ls.16–25, p.47, Ls.2–11, p.71, Ls.6–13.)
Officer Hewson began the questioning by asking Mr. Godwin what he was “drug in for,”
to which Mr. Godwin responded that he came in “voluntarily.” (Inter. Tr., p.2, Ls.7–10.)
Mr. Godwin said Officer Ulmer asked him to come in to talk. (Inter. Tr., p.2, Ls.12–21.) Officer
Hewson asked Mr. Godwin about Dudley and what he was doing up there. (Inter. Tr., p.2, L.24–
p.5, L.17.) About four minutes into the questioning, Officer Hewson asked Mr. Godwin what
Officer Johnson talked to him about. (Tr., p.5, Ls.17–18; Ex. A (Jason a), 4:13–4:33.)
Mr.  Godwin  responded  that  Officer  Johnson  told  him  Mr.  Anderson  was  shot  and  killed.  (Tr.,
p.5, Ls.19–23.) Officer Hewson then asked:
Well, yeah, I mean your name did get thrown out there, that you may have been
there. This is the whole thing, the way that we looked at it, is what it looked like
to us happened was that it was probably something that wasn’t meant to happen.
Somebody didn’t mean to do what they did. It would be a little different if Kyle
got shot, and if it was just shot in cold blood: I’m going to kill you, as opposed to
something happening, that somebody didn’t meant for it to happen. Totally
different set of circumstances. Are you sure you left at 1:00 yesterday [for
Dudley]?
(Inter. Tr., p.5, L.24–p.6, L.10.) Mr. Godwin continued to go through his day on June 9 with
Officer Hewson. (Inter. Tr., p.6, L.11–p.9, L.1) Officer Hewson reminded him, “I just kind of
have to stress: That if I catch you telling me something that isn’t true, it doesn’t look good.”
(Inter. Tr., p.6, L.25–p.7, L.2.) After Mr. Godwin denied being in Kooskia on the evening of
June 9, Officer Hewson confronted him: “There’s people that saw you at the trailer at 7:00,
Jason. That’s what I’m talking about.” (Inter. Tr., p.8, L.24–p.9, L.3.) Officer Hewson then got
the first confession from Mr. Godwin:
Q. I’m not trying to ride you, please.
A. Okay.
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Q. Okay. I don’t like treating people like that, but you got to kind of understand
what I am –
A. They’re trying to accuse me of shooting this guy or (inaudible)?
Q. They are saying that, yes, something happened between you and him, and it
was  more  or  less  an  accident.  And  that’s  all  we’re  trying  to  get  cleared  up.  If
something happened between you guys and it was an accident, I wish that you
would talk to us about it.
A. Fine. Pulled up there and –
Q. What time?
A.–the guy pointed a gun at me, and I grabbed my gun and shot him.
Q. Okay.
A. And then I left.
Q. What time, Jason?
A. I don’t know. About 10:00.
Q. Okay. Why would you –
A. I don’t know. I pulled up there. (Inaudible) with me, and (inaudible) he was
after that guy for some reason.
(Inter. Tr., p.9, Ls.5–19 (emphasis added).) This first confession occurred approximately nine
minutes into the questioning. (Ex. A (Jason a), 8:40–9:48.) Officer Hewson testified he was
using minimization techniques to question Mr. Godwin about his involvement in the shooting.
(Tr., p.107, L.21–p.108, L.10, p.110, L.12–p.111, L.10.)
After Mr. Godwin’s first confession, Officer Hewson did not provide Mr. Godwin with
Miranda warnings. Instead, he asked Mr. Godwin, “Explain that to me again.” (Inter. Tr., p.10,
L.3 (emphasis added).) Officer Hewson continued to question Mr. Godwin about the night of
Mr. Anderson’s death. (Tr., p.10, L.4–p.15, L.9.) At one point, Officer Hewson asked:
Q. So, you must know Bo’s last name. What is it?
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A. I’m trying to think. You guys really know everything though.
Q. That’s why if you don’t tell the truth, it look worse. I mean, you get that.
A. (Inaudible) I’m trying to tell the truth.
Q. And right now I think you’re doing great, and I think that you’re gaining a lot
of credibility with me.
A. (Inaudible) shop. He pointed a gun right at me, and I pulled it out of my pocket
and went after him and shot him.
(Inter. Tr., p.14, Ls.13–25 (emphasis added).) Again, Officer Hewson did not provide
Mr. Godwin with Miranda warnings after his second confession, but instead kept questioning
him. (See Inter. Tr., p.15, Ls.1–9.)
Mr. Godwin once again said he acted in self-defense, and Officer Hewson responded,
“Yeah. Well, have you ever had your rights read to you, your Miranda rights? Because I’m
going to do that anyway.” (Inter. Tr., p.15, Ls.14–16.) Mr. Godwin asked, “Are you going to
arrest me?” (Inter. Tr., p.15, L.17.) Officer Hewson answered:
Q. I don’t make those kind of decisions, okay. I probably won’t arrest you. That
doesn’t mean that somebody else like Jerry [(Officer Johnson)] or somebody
might, but I’m just tell you right out of the gate that it looked or sounded to me
like a scenario that happened –
A. (Inaudible) drug dealer, and Ernie was going to rip him off. That’s all I know.
Q. It sounded like a scenario to me that happened; that it wasn’t meant to happen.
Somebody didn’t go there just to kill a man, you know. That’s what it looked like
to me, okay.
(Inter. Tr., p.15, L.18–p.16, L.3; see also Ex. A (Jason a), 16:19–17:02.) Mr. Godwin again
admitted to shooting Mr. Anderson in self-defense. (Inter. Tr., p.16, Ls.4–5.)
Finally, about seventeen minutes into the interrogation, Officer Hewson told Mr. Godwin
that he would read him his Miranda rights:
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Q. Yeah. Let me see if he has a rights waiver. You should know your rights.
A. (Inaudible) my rights?
Q. Pardon me?
A. (Inaudible) waive my rights?
Q. No. I’m going to read you your rights. That’s what I’m going to do. I’m going
to see if one of these guys has –
A. You shouldn’t be reading it to me after I already said something.
Q. I didn’t have to read them to you to begin with, and I still don’t,  because  I
would have read you your rights if you were under arrest and then I questioned
you. You weren’t under arrest or detained at the time I – that we started talking. I
just  want  to  make  sure  that  you  know  –  do  you  have  a  rights  waiver,  just  a
Miranda warning?
(Inter. Tr., p.16, Ls.4–22 (emphasis added); Ex. A (Jason a), 17:10–17:51.) At this point, an
unidentified person agreed to get a Miranda waiver for Officer Hewson. (Inter. Tr., p.16, L.23.)
Officer Hewson continued to discuss the crime and question Mr. Godwin. (Inter. Tr., p.16, L.25–
p.17, L.21.) About one minute later, Officer Hewson got a copy of the Miranda waiver. (Inter.
Tr., p.17, L.22–p.18, L.1.) He then told Mr. Godwin:
Q. Miranda warning is what this is. I want to make sure you know what your
rights are. You have a right to know, right. If I can read it.
A. I’m sorry, Augie (phonetic), but I ain’t an attorney.4
Q. I get it, and I knew you did, okay. That’s why I wanted to keep giving you –
but let’s try again. I’m going to read this.
A. I never had – did anything like in any point in my life, and he’s pointing a gun
right at my head, pretty close.
4 The parties disputed this statement at the suppression hearing. Mr. Godwin argued that he said,
“I need an attorney,” (R., p.183), and the State argued that Mr. Godwin said, “I’m sorry I lied to
you but I ain’t an attorney,” (R., p.467). Officer Hewson testified that he did not hear the word
“attorney” at all from Mr. Godwin. (Tr., p.114, L.23–p.116, L.7.) The district court found that
Mr. Godwin said, “I’m sorry, Augie (phonetic), but I ain’t an attorney.” (R., pp.505–06.)
Mr. Godwin does not challenge this factual finding on appeal due to a lack of a sufficient record.
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Q.  Let  me  read  this  to  you,  okay.  You  have  the  right  to  remain  silent  when
questioned. That’s pretty self-explanatory, right? If you choose to answer
questions, statements you make can be used against you in a court of law. I said,
they can be. You have the right to an attorney before and/or during questioning. If
you are unable to afford a lawyer and if you need one, one will be appointed to
you by the Court. And he’s a good lawyer. I know him. Do you understand those?
And you can stop talking to me, Jason, anytime you want, okay?
A. I may have to.
(Inter. Tr., p.18, L.1–p.19, L.1; see also Ex. A (Jason a), 18:58–20:15.) After these warnings,
Officer Hewson continued to question Mr. Godwin about the crime for the next thirty-seven
minutes. (Inter. Tr., p.19, L.2–p.46, L.9; Ex. A (Jason a), 20:15–57:32.)
While Officer Hewson questioned Mr. Godwin, Officer Johnson met with Ms. Jones.
(Tr., p.38, Ls.5–9.) Ms. Jones did not identify Mr. Godwin from a photo line-up, but she
affirmatively identified Ms. Griner/Cutler. (Tr., p.38, Ls.8–14.) After a total of fifty-seven
minutes of questioning, Officer Johnson interrupted Officer Hewson to inform him of the photo
line-up results. (Tr., p.38, L.24–p.39, L.10; Inter. Tr., p.46, Ls.16–17; Ex. A (Jason a), 57:32–
57:52.) Officer Hewson in turn told Officer Johnson that Mr. Godwin confessed to the shooting.
(Tr., p.38, Ls.5–7.) During this time, Mr. Godwin went outside to have a cigarette. (Tr., p.126,
L.19–p.127, L.1, p.127, L.9–p.128, L.8.) A deputy went outside with Mr. Godwin, although
Officer Hewson denied asking the deputy to accompany him. (Tr., p.127, Ls.17–18, p.129, Ls.4–
8.) Officer Hewson then resumed the interview and questioned Mr. Godwin for another eleven
minutes until Officer Johnson entered the room. (Inter. Tr., p.46, L.17–p.53, L.20; Ex. A (Jason
b), 0:00–11:53.) Officer Hewson told him, “I think we’re pretty much finished up. I mean, He’s
painted a pretty good picture and –” (Inter. Tr., p.53, Ls.15–17.)
After the questioning, Officer Johnson or Officer Hewson had Mr. Godwin placed under
arrest. (Tr., p.42, Ls.16–22.) Officer Johnson testified the arrest happened “because of the
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interview with [Officer] Hewson, and [Officer] Hewson apparently felt  that  all  of the elements
were there, as he expressed to me what Jason Godwin told him. I concurred, and he was placed
under arrest.”5 (Tr., p.42, L.25–p.43, L.4.) Officer Johnson testified they would not have been
able to arrest Mr. Godwin without his confession. (Tr., p.43, Ls.5–18.)
D. The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Godwin’s Motion To Suppress Because
Officer Hewson’s Delayed Miranda Warnings After Mr. Godwin’s First Confession
Failed To Cure The Fifth Amendment Violation
Mr. Godwin asserts his statements were the product of a custodial interrogation and thus
inadmissible. His Fifth Amendment claim is raised in two parts. First, Mr. Godwin contends he
was subject to a custodial interrogation after his first confession and, therefore, his statements
made  after  this  confession,  but  before  the  delayed Miranda warnings, must be suppressed.
Second, he argues his statements made after the delayed Miranda warnings must also be
suppressed, as they were the product of a deliberate Miranda violation and an intentional
interrogation technique to ask first, warn later.
1. After Mr. Godwin’s First Confession, Miranda Warnings Were Required Because
Officer Hewson’s Questioning Of Mr. Godwin Transformed To A Custodial
Interrogation Upon That Confession
“Miranda v. Arizona requires that a person be informed of his or her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination prior to custodial interrogation; otherwise, incriminating
statements are inadmissible.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 795 (2003). “Miranda warnings
are required where a suspect is ‘in custody’” and subject to an “interrogation.” State v. James,
148 Idaho 574, 576 (2010); Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795. At the trial level, the district court found
Miranda warnings were not required because Mr. Godwin “was not in custody until such time as
5 Contrary to Officer Johnson’s testimony, Officer Hewson testified he did not have enough
information  to  arrest  Mr.  Godwin  and  Officer  Johnson,  along  with  the  prosecutor,  made  the
decision to arrest him. (Tr., p.141, L.21–p.142, L.9.)
18
he was arrested.” (R., p.508.) The district court did not address the “interrogation” component.
(See R., pp.505–08.) On appeal, Mr. Godwin asserts both components were met—Mr. Godwin
was in custody and subject to an interrogation after his first confession.
a. Mr. Godwin Was Subjected To An Interrogation
“Interrogation” has an expansive meaning. Interrogation includes not only “express
questioning,” but also “its ‘functional equivalent.’” State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 406 (2016)
(quoting Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526 (1987)). “The functional equivalent of
interrogation includes ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant  to  arrest  and  custody)  that  the  police  should  know  are  reasonably  likely  to  elicit  an
incriminating response.’” State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 267 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980)). “The latter portion of this definition focuses
primarily  upon  the  perceptions  of  the  suspect,  rather  than  the  intent  of  the  police.” Innis, 446
U.S. at 301. Thus, “[a] practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response from a suspect”—through either express questioning or its functional
equivalent—“amounts to interrogation.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
Here, Officer Hewson interrogated Mr. Godwin. Officer Hewson engaged in a mix of
express questioning and its functional equivalent to elicit incriminating responses from
Mr. Godwin. After Mr. Godwin’s first confession, Officer Hewson told him, “Explain that to me
again.” (Inter. Tr., p.10, L.3.) A police officer should know that asking a suspect to explain again
how he shot the deceased victim is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Next,
Officer Hewson asked Mr. Godwin if he had Mr. Anderson’s gun, how he knew Mr. Anderson,
why he went to Mr. Anderson’s motorhome, who wanted to talk to Mr. Anderson, how he knew
Mr. Ruiz, why Mr. Ruiz was with him, who was driving, what vehicle he was driving, who was
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in  the  vehicle,  what  kind  of  gun  he  used,  what  kind  of  gun  Mr.  Anderson  had,  who  took
Mr. Anderson’s gun, where everyone was located the vehicle, if he got out of the vehicle, why he
got out of the vehicle, how he knew Mr. Lynch, and how far away Mr. Anderson was when he
shot him. (Inter. Tr., p.10, L.8–p.15, L.1, p.17, Ls.7–21.) These questions were singularly
focused on gaining information from Mr. Godwin on the night of Mr. Anderson’s death. Indeed,
during this barrage of questioning, Officer Hewson obtained a second confession from
Mr. Godwin. (Inter. Tr., p.14, Ls.23–25.) But, instead of reading Mr. Godwin his Miranda rights,
Officer Hewson asked another question, “How far away was [Mr. Anderson]?” (Inter. Tr., p.15,
L.1.) Officer Hewson should have known these express questions and functional equivalents
were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses from Mr. Godwin on his involvement
with Mr. Anderson’s death. This constituted an interrogation for Miranda purposes.
Moreover, Officer Hewson continued the interrogation after providing Mr. Godwin with
Miranda warnings. Officer Hewson questioned Mr. Godwin about his activities on the night
Mr. Anderson’s death for the next thirty-seven minutes after the warnings. (Inter. Tr., p.19, L.2–
p.53, L.20; Ex. A (Jason a), 20:16–57:52.) For example, Officer Hewson asked Mr. Godwin
about what he did after he shot Mr. Anderson and if anyone threatened Ms. Jones. (Inter.
Tr., p.20, L.23–p.30, L.17.) He asked about Mr. Godwin’s reasons for going to Mr. Anderson’s
motorhome. (Inter. Tr., p.35, L.18–p.38, L.23.) Then, after the break to confer with Officer
Johnson, Officer Hewson kept questioning Mr. Godwin for another eleven minutes about the
shooting, including his guns and, in particular, the threats to Ms. Jones. (Inter. Tr., p.46, L.18–
p.53, L.12; Ex. A (Jason b), 0:00–11:55.) Officer Hewson got at least another nine confessions
out of Mr. Godwin during this post-Miranda phase of the interrogation. (Inter. Tr., p.22, Ls.13–
14, p.23, Ls.19–21, p.27, Ls.8–10, p.36, Ls.6–9, p.38, Ls.12–13, p.39, Ls.10–12, p.39, Ls.20–23,
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p.41, Ls.18–19, p.47, Ls.22–25.) Officer Hewson should have known his combination of express
questioning and functional equivalents were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses.
b. Mr. Godwin Was In Custody
The second component to trigger Miranda warnings is “custody.” The district court ruled
determined Mr. Godwin was not in custody. (R., pp.505–08.) Mr. Godwin submits the district
court’s ruling was in error. He asserts, upon his first confession, he was in custody.
This custody inquiry presents is a matter of first impression for this Court—whether a
suspect  is  in  custody  once  he  confesses  to  serious  criminal  conduct.  A  number  of  state  courts
have held a suspect is in custody upon his confession, and this Court should agree. A confession
to a serious crime transforms a voluntary interview into a custodial situation. Alternatively, if
this Court declines to adopt this bright-line rule, this Court should still consider a confession to
be a significant factor in the custody determination. Either way, Mr. Godwin was in a custodial
situation once he confessed to shooting Mr. Anderson. A reasonable person in Mr. Godwin’s
position would not perceive that he was free to leave.
“A  person  is  in  custody  whenever  subjected  to  a  restraint  on  his  or  her  liberty  in  any
degree similar to a formal arrest.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795 (citations omitted). “To determine
whether  custody  has  attached,  ‘a  court  must  examine  all  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  the
interrogation.’” James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322
(1994)).
Factors to be considered may include the degree of restraint on the person’s
freedom of movement (including whether the person is placed in handcuffs),
whether the subject is informed that the detention is more than temporary, the
location and visibility of the interrogation, whether other individuals were present,
the number of questions asked, the duration of the interrogation or detention, the
time of  the  interrogation,  the  number  of  officers  present,  the  number  of  officers
involved in the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, and the nature and
manner of the questioning.
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State v. Christensen, 159 Idaho 339, 351 (Ct. App. 2015). “The test is an objective one and ‘the
only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood
his situation.’” James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442
(1984)). Law enforcement’s “unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect
was ‘in custody’ at a particular time.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. “[C]ustody must be
determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive his
circumstances,” without consideration of the officer’s subjective views. Yarborough v. Alvarado,
541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004).
Several state courts have held a suspect is in custody after his confession to a serious
crime. State v. Pitts, 936 So. 2d 1111, 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“Once that confession to
the commission of a serious crime had been uttered, a reasonable person in [the defendant’s]
situation would have understood that he would not be allowed to go free. At that point, the
interrogation became custodial . . . .”); People v. Carroll, 742 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2001) (“[D]efendant knew that the officers suspected him of murder because he had just,
moments earlier, inculpated himself in the crime. Considering these facts, the trial court’s finding
that any reasonable person in defendant’s position would have believed himself to be in custody
despite the officers’ assurances to the contrary was not manifestly erroneous.”); Jackson v. State,
528 S.E.2d 232, 235 (Ga. 2000) (“A reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position, having just
confessed to involvement in a crime in the presence of law enforcement officers would, from that
time forward, perceive himself to be in custody, and expect that his future freedom of action
would be significantly curtailed.”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Mass. 1997)
(“[A]fter the defendant told the police that he was there to confess to the murder of his girl friend
[sic], given the information the police already had received about the murder, we conclude that if
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he had wanted to leave at that point, he would not have been free to do so.”); Kolb v. State, 930
P.2d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 1996) (“A reasonable person who confessed to a killing while being
interviewed at a police station would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the
station.  Thus,  the  interrogation  that  followed  the  confession  did  so  while  Mr.  Kolb  was  in
custody . . . .”); People v. Ripic, 182 A.D.2d 226, 235–36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (“The People
contend that defendant’s ‘ambiguous’ statement, ‘I had to kill him,’ did not transform the
noncustodial situation to a custodial one and that the poststatement inquiry by the investigators at
the  hospital  was  therefore  proper  under  the  circumstances.  We  disagree  and  affirm  County
Court’s alternative finding that if defendant was not ‘in custody’ prior to that statement, ‘there is
absolutely no doubt’ that she was ‘in custody’ after that statement.”); see also Locke v. Cattell,
476 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that “several state courts have found custodial
interrogations following an admission,” but recognizing “no Supreme Court case” on the issue).
As explored in these cases, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would understand
himself to be in custody having confessed to a serious crime to a police officer at a police station.
Applying this rule here, Mr. Godwin was in custody once he confessed to shooting
Mr. Anderson. Mr. Godwin does not dispute he initially came to the police station voluntarily.
(R., p.506.) This noncustodial situation changed, however, once Mr. Godwin admitted to the
crime. Mr. Godwin confessed to shooting Mr. Anderson (“Pulled up there and . . . the guy
pointed a gun at me, and I grabbed my gun and shot him”), and no reasonable person would feel
free  to  leave  the  police  station  at  that  point.  “[I]t  is  utter  sophistry  to  suggest  that  a  person  in
defendant’s position, having made such an incriminating statement to police officers concerning
the very homicide they were investigating, would feel that [ ]he was not under arrest and was
free to leave.” Ripic, 182 A.D.2d at 236. Upon his first confession, the voluntary interview
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transformed to custodial interrogation, and therefore Miranda warnings were required.
Alternatively, even if Mr. Godwin’s confession alone did not create a custodial situation,
his confession is a significant factor that, along with the other circumstances, contributed to him
being in custody. For example, in Xu v. State, the Texas appellate court held the defendant’s
“pivotal  admission”  to  the  crime,  plus  other  factors,  established  the  defendant  was  in  custody
from his admission forward. 100 S.W.3d 408, 413–15 (Tex. App. 2002). Similarly, in State v.
Oney, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule, but nonetheless reasoned, “We
acknowledge that once a suspect confesses to committing a serious criminal act, this fact is
significant in this evaluation.” 989 A.2d 995, 1000 (Vt. 2009). “[T]he severity of the crime
confessed to affects the weight we attribute to this factor.” Id. As such, “mere confession to what
defendant believed to be three misdemeanors would not necessarily lead a reasonable person in
defendant’s circumstances to believe that he was not free to leave.” Id. Likewise, in
Commonwealth v. Hilton, the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to “‘freeze-frame’ the
instant when the defendant first made an inculpatory remark” to create a custodial situation. 823
N.E.2d 383, 397 (Mass. 2005). “As a suspect makes incriminating statements, a previously
noncustodial  setting  can  become custodial—a person  who has  just  confessed  to  a  crime would
reasonably expect that she was no longer free to leave. However, an interview does not
automatically become custodial at the instant a defendant starts to confess.” Id. at 396.
Nevertheless, the court held the defendant was in custody shortly after her confession because
the police engaged in “detailed questioning” with the defendant as the “focal point of the
investigation.” Id. at 397; see also State v. Bartelt, 906 N.W.2d 684, 702 (Wis. 2018) (Bradley,
J., dissenting) (stating that it “stretches the bounds of credulity” for the majority to hold that a
suspect could confess to serious felony and “and then march past detectives on the way out of the
24
interrogation room and the police station”); but see id. at 694–700 (majority opinion) (holding
the admission to a crime is only one factor). While a confession may not immediately transform
noncustodial setting into a custodial one, that confession coupled with the other factors can
create a situation in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.
The factors in this case, including Mr. Godwin’s confession, tip in favor of a custodial
setting. Mr. Godwin recognizes some facts are neutral. “The mere fact that an interview was
conducted in a law enforcement facility, by an officer, at that officer’s request, is not sufficient
for a finding of custody.” Huffaker, 160 Idaho at 406. Mr. Godwin was questioned at the
sheriff’s office, by Officer Hewson, at Officer Ulmer and Johnson’s request. (R., pp.506–07.)
Additionally, while Officer Hewson and Officer Johnson traded information, Mr. Godwin took a
cigarette break, albeit with a police officer accompanying him. (R., p.506.) Yet, despite these
neutral factors, there are “some additional factual circumstances—some element of coercion or
influence by law enforcement—which would cause a reasonable person to feel his or her
freedom of movement was restrained.” Huffaker, 160 Idaho at 406. First, as explored above,
Mr. Godwin confessed to a serious crime:  homicide. His “pivotal admission”—from denying he
was in Kooskia to admitting to shooting Mr. Anderson—weighs heavily in favor of a custody
determination. See Xu, 100 S.W.3d at 413. Second, Officer Hewson’s detailed questioning about
the particulars of the crime transformed the “nonaccusatory interview into a custodial
interrogation.” Hilton, 823 N.E.2d at 397. (See Inter. Tr., p.9, L.22–p.15, L.13.) Third, Officer
Hewson used minimization techniques to get a confession and then other implicitly coercive
tactics to obtain more information. For example, Officer Hewson told Mr. Godwin, “That’s why
if you don’t tell the truth, it looks worse. I mean, you get that,” “The more honest you are with
me,  the  better  it’s  going  to  look  for  you,”  and  “Somebody pointed  a  gun  at  her.  Don’t  tell  me
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most of the truth.” (Inter. Tr., p.14, Ls.17–18, p.26, Ls.22–23, p.48, Ls.17–18.) Officer Hewson
analogized the situation to the “old creepy” “horror movie” “The Hills Have Eyes” because
“[w]hen you’re driving down the street and you think nobody is watching, there’s probably
somebody watching.” (Inter. Tr., p.28, Ls.13–22.) He told Mr. Godwin, “Well, it is like I told
you: I don’t make – I just try to find the facts, okay. I have bosses, right. I have bosses like Doug
Ulmer and Jerry, you know what I mean. I have a silver badge. They have a gold badge, okay.”
(Inter. Tr., p.41, L.23–p.42, L.2.) Further, Officer Hewson told Mr. Godwin that the interview
would not end until Officer Hewson was satisfied with Mr. Godwin’s answers. When
Mr. Godwin said, “We better get the gun,” and Officer Hewson responded, “We will do that.
Okay. We will do that. We are not in a hurry here, Jason. Again, it’s kind of important for you
to remember: what did Ernie do with Amanda outside the trailer?” (Inter. Tr., p.26, Ls.4–6
(emphasis added).) Later on, Officer Hewson said, “Just think about it. We are not in a hurry.”
(Inter. Tr., p.47, Ls.20–21 (emphasis added).) Officer Hewson also told him, “Okay, because we
are doing good, I think, so far. Is there anything else you can think of, Jason, about this whole
incident?” (Inter. Tr., p.45, Ls.12–14 (emphasis added).) These coercive statements, along with
pointed questions about the crime, established a custodial setting. A reasonable person in
Mr. Godwin’s position, having admitted to a police officer at the police station to shooting and
killing a person, would understand his situation to be that he was subject to a restraint on his
liberty akin to a formal arrest.
c. Due To The Custodial Interrogation Without Miranda Warnings,
Mr.  Godwin’s  Statements  After  His  First  Confession,  But  Before  The
Delayed Warnings, Must Be Suppressed
As established above, Mr. Godwin was subject to a custodial interrogation after his first
confession to Officer Hewson. This custodial interrogation “triggered” the requirement of
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Miranda warnings. State v. Arenas, 161 Idaho 642, 645 (Ct. App. 2016). Accordingly, Officer
Hewson was required to provide Mr. Godwin with Miranda warnings immediately after his
confession. See Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795. The district court erred in determining Mr. Godwin
was not in custody and, as such, no warnings were required. (R., pp.505–08.) The district court
should have suppressed any “exculpatory or inculpatory statements stemming from custodial
interrogation of [Mr. Godwin] unless the questioning was preceded by” Miranda warnings.
Munoz, 149 Idaho at 128. Therefore, Mr. Godwin’s statements between his first confession and
the delayed Miranda warnings must be suppressed.
2. Mr.  Godwin’s  Statements  After  The  Delayed Miranda Warnings Must Also Be
Suppressed Because The Warnings Did Not Cure The Fifth Amendment Violation
The final issue is whether Officer Hewson’s delayed Miranda warnings adequately
advised Mr. Godwin of his Fifth Amendment rights. The facts show, however, that Officer
Hewson’s midstream Miranda warnings did not inform Mr. Godwin that a separate and distinct
round of interrogation had begun and that he had a genuine choice to remain silent. Thus,
Mr. Godwin’s post-warning statements were also subject to suppression.
a. Post-Miranda Statements  Must  Be  Suppressed  If  The  Interrogator
Deliberately Used A Two-Step Strategy To Ask First, Warn Later
This Court recently addressed the admissibility of post-Miranda statements in State v.
Wass, 162 Idaho 361, 396 P.3d 1243 (2017).6 In Wass,  the  defendant  made  an  unwarned
inculpatory statement and the officer, upon realizing his “mistake,” gave the defendant Miranda
warnings about two minutes later. Id. at 1244–45. After the warnings, the officer questioned the
defendant again and the defendant made the same inculpatory statement. Id. at 1245. To
determine whether the second inculpatory statement was admissible, this Court adopted the test
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from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Wass, 396 P.3d
at 1248–49.
In Seibert, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between a “good-faith Miranda
mistake,” and a “conscious decision” to ask first, warn later. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605–06, 614
(plurality opinion); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (on good-faith Miranda
mistakes). The “manifest purpose” to ask first, warn later “is obvious”—“to get a confession the
suspect would not make if he understood his rights at the outset; the sensible underlying
assumption is that with one confession in hand before the warnings, the interrogator can count on
getting its duplicate, with trifling additional trouble.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613. If the interrogator
employed an ask first, warn later technique to elicit a confession before advising the suspect of
his rights, “the warnings will be ineffective in preparing the suspect for successive interrogation,
close in time and similar in context.” Id. at 613. For the plurality, the ultimate question was
whether “a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes could have seen the [second] questioning as
a new and distinct experience” so that the Miranda warnings “made sense” as “a genuine choice”
to remain silent. Id. at 615–16. The plurality identified several factors7 to  determine  if  the
midstream Miranda warnings were “effective enough to accomplish their object.” Id. at 615.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, set forth “a narrower test only in the infrequent
case . . . in which the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to
6 As of the date of filing the Appellant’s Brief, a Petition for a Writ Certiorari is pending with the
U.S. Supreme Court.
7 The factors are: “[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round
of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first
and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s
questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615.
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undermine the Miranda warning.” Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Rather
than employing a “multifactor test” in every case to determine if the delayed warnings
accomplished their objective, Justice Kennedy advanced statement would be admissible absent a
“deliberate two-step strategy.” Id. at 621–22. This Court adopted Justice Kennedy’s narrow test.
Wass, 396 P.3d at 1248–49. Accordingly, if the two-stage interrogation was intentional, then the
Court uses the Seibert plurality’s multifactor test to determine admissibility. Wass, 396 P.3d at
1249. Otherwise, the post-Miranda statements are admissible. Id.
b. The Objective Facts Show Officer Hewson Used A Deliberate Two-Step
Strategy With Mr. Godwin After His First Confession
Although Wass clarified the framework for the admissibility of ask first, warn later
statements, the Wass Court did not explore “how a court should determine whether an
interrogator used a deliberate two-step strategy.” United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158
(9th Cir. 2006) (adopting Justice Kennedy’s test). The Ninth Circuit, in joining “our sister
circuits,” held “in determining whether the interrogator deliberately withheld the Miranda
warning, courts should consider whether objective evidence and any available subjective
evidence, such as an officer’s testimony, support an inference that the two-step interrogation
procedure was used to undermine the Miranda warning.” Williams, 435 F.3d at 1158. The Ninth
Circuit noted this was a combination of the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s approach. Id. at
1158 n.12. The objective evidence includes the factors from the Seibert plurality: “the timing,
setting and completeness of the prewarning interrogation, the continuity of police personnel and
the overlapping content of the pre- and postwarning statements.” Williams, 435 F.3d at 1159.
The focus must be on the objective evidence to show the “question-first tactic at work” because
“the intent of the officer will rarely be . . . candidly admitted.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 n.6. In
summary, “[t]he court should consider any objective evidence or available expressions of
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subjective intent suggesting that the officer acted deliberately to undermine and obscure the
warning’s meaning and effect.” Williams, 435 F.3d at 1160.
In the case at hand, the objective evidence supports an inference that Officer Hewson
deliberately used a two-stage interrogation strategy. The Seibert factors  are  in  favor  of  an
intentional tactic. After Mr. Godwin’s first confession, Officer Hewson asked detailed questions
about the crime. There was no lapse in time or change in setting between the first confession and
the post-warning statements. The same officer (Officer Hewson) questioned Mr. Godwin for the
entire interrogation.8 Finally, Officer Hewson’s questions treated the “second round as
continuous with the first.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615. These objective factors weigh in favor of a
deliberate strategy to obtain a confession first and give “ineffective” warnings second. Id. at 613.
Turning to subjective evidence, Officer Hewson’s testimony provides no expressions of
subjective intent to alter the objective facts of an intentional two-step tactic. For one, Officer
Hewson did not testify his failure to warn Mr. Godwin after the first confession was a “mistake
or accident.” Wass, 162 Idaho at 361. Officer Hewson was not trying to correct an innocent
omission when he finally read Mr. Godwin the Miranda warnings. Second, Officer Hewson
acknowledged his use of minimization techniques “to get him to say he was involved, if he was
involved.” (Tr., p.110, L.17–p.111, L.7.) Third, Officer Hewson’s testimony on his state of mind
after Mr. Godwin’s first confession indicates he realized Miranda warnings were required, but
did not act for about ten minutes of questioning. Officer Hewson testified, “I still even at that
point in time [of the confession] did not feel like Miranda needed to be read. I typically have a
history of reading Miranda probably long before I need to with people. But I could see the
8 During the interrogation, Mr. Godwin briefly answered some questions from Officer Ulmer on
Officer Hewson’s phone. (Inter. Tr., p.32, L.14–p.33, L.14.)
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conversation was changing, and I wanted to protect myself later on down the road . . . .”
(Tr., p.111, Ls.16–21.) He also admitted, “I did not know he was even in the country at the time
of the shooting, but things started to change so that – that’s why I eventually read the Miranda
warning to him.” (Tr., p.112, Ls.1–5.) As to when the “conversation” changed, Officer Hewson
testified, “At the point in time that he said he was defending himself, and he shot Kyle Anderson.
And I don’t remember if he expanded on that at that point in time9 and started to talk about what
they were doing with Kyle Anderson after he had been shot. I’m not sure what that point was to
where I started thinking, should probably read Miranda warning, okay.” (Tr., p.113, Ls.4–10.)
He also said, “I felt that the course of the conversation was changing. All the sudden we went
from being in Dudley, Idaho to being on scene and shooting him, you know. So, I just felt that
things had changed enough where, you know, it was probably a good idea to read him his
rights.” (Tr., p.142, Ls.17–22.) This testimony shows that Mr. Godwin’s first confession
prompted Officer Hewson to think Miranda warnings were required, and yet Officer Hewson did
not give those warnings right away. Instead, Officer Hewson asked Mr. Godwin, “Explain that to
me again,” (Inter. Tr., p.10, L.3), and questioned him for another ten minutes. Granted, Officer
Hewson’s testimony does not rise to the level of the Seibert officer’s candid admission to
withhold warnings, 542 U.S. at 605–06, but his testimony is, at best, neutral as to his subjective
intent during the interrogation.
In  sum,  the  objective  evidence  suggests  Officer  Hewson  deliberately  used  a  two-step
tactic to obtain a confession from Mr. Godwin and then provide the requisite warnings. Unlike
Wass, the evidence does not indicate Officer Hewson “made a mistake in questioning
9 Mr. Godwin “expanded” on shooting Mr. Anderson because Officer Hewson said, “Explain
that to me again.” (Inter. Tr., p.10, L.3.)
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[Mr. Godwin] before giving him his Miranda rights, realized his mistake, and immediately
attempted to correct his mistake by giving [Mr. Godwin] his Miranda warnings and questioning
him again.” 396 P.3d at 1249. Likewise, this is not a situation where “[a]n officer may not realize
that a suspect is in custody and warnings are required,” or “[t]he officer may not plan to question
the suspect or may be waiting for a more appropriate time.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in judgment). This was a situation where Officer Hewson was instructed by his
superior, Officer Johnson, to get information from Mr. Godwin, the primary and only suspect in
Mr. Anderson’s murder. Once Officer Hewson obtained a confession, his failure to provide
Miranda warnings immediately was a deliberate strategy to obtain more unwarned statements
and to diminish the effectiveness of the delayed warnings.
c. The Midstream Miranda Warnings Did Not Adequately And Effectively
Apprise Mr. Godwin Of His Choice To Exercise His Fifth Amendment
Rights
Having established an intentional two-stage interrogation, the last question is whether
Officer Hewson’s delayed warnings were “effective enough to accomplish their object.” Seibert,
542 U.S. at 615 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
To determine whether a suspect understood that he “had a genuine choice” to remain silent or
follow-up on his prior admissions, this Court uses the Seibert multifactor test. Wass, 396 P.3d at
1249. In addition these factors, Justice Kennedy recommended the courts examine any “curative
measures,” such as “a substantial break in time and circumstances between the prewarning
statement and the Miranda warning” or “an additional warning that explains the likely
inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement.” Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment). Even with the focus on different factors, the concern for Justice Kennedy was the
same  as  the  plurality:  “to  ensure  that  a  reasonable  person  in  the  suspect’s  situation  would
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understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver.” Id.
In this case,  the Seibert factors do not ensure that a reasonable person in Mr. Godwin’s
position would adequately understand his Fifth Amendment protections once given the Miranda
warnings. None of the Seibert factors  were  met  to  allow  Mr.  Godwin  “to  distinguish  the  two
contexts and appreciate that the interrogation has taken a new turn.” Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment). The least compelling factor is the first: the completeness and detail of
the questions and answers. But, even so, the detail of the questions and answers in the first round
mirrored the second round. Both focused on Mr. Godwin’s involvement in Mr. Andersons’s
death. The remaining factors weigh heavily in favor of suppression: overlapping content, timing
and setting, continuity of personnel, and continuity of questioning. Id. at 615 (plurality opinion).
The contents of Mr. Godwin’s statements overlapped entirely. Again, his admissions all revolved
around his shooting of Mr. Anderson. The timing and setting of the first and second statements
did not change. Mr. Godwin’s statements were made within the same hour-long interrogation in
the same room. There was continuity of police personnel. Officer Hewson questioned
Mr. Godwin for almost the entire time. (See App. Br., p.30, n.8.) The interrogator’s questions
treated the second round as continuous with the first. Officer Hewson made no distinction or
pause between the pre- and post-Miranda questioning. “The truly ‘effective’ Miranda warnings .
. . will occur only when certain circumstances—a lapse in time, a change in location or
interrogating officer, or a shift in the focus of the questioning—intervene between the unwarned
questioning and any postwarning statement.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring).
These circumstances were simply not present here.
Moreover, no curative measures were done to separate the pre- and post-Miranda
interrogations. “[A]n additional warning that explains the likely inadmissibility of the
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prewarning custodial statement may be sufficient.” Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment). “[T]elling a suspect that ‘anything you say can and will be used against you,’ without
expressly excepting the statement just given, could lead to an entirely reasonable inference that
what he has just said will be used, with subsequent silence being of no avail.” Id. at 613
(plurality opinion). In this case, Officer Hewson gave no additional warnings or offered any
other curative measures. (Inter. Tr., p.18, Ls.15-25.) In fact, Officer Hewson did the opposite. He
repeatedly minimized the situation and the objectives of Miranda warnings. When Mr. Godwin
asked if Officer Hewson would arrest him, Officer Hewson said, “I probably won’t arrest you,”
even though someone else “might,” because it looked to him like “it wasn’t meant to happen.”
(Inter. Tr., p.15, L.17-p.16, L.1.) He also told Mr. Godwin “I still don’t” “have to read you your
rights” after the first confession. (Inter. Tr., p.16, Ls.16-20.) He warned Mr. Godwin, “That’s
why if you don’t tell the truth, it looks worse. I mean, you get that.” (Inter. Tr., p.14, Ls.17-18.)
Upon hearing the Miranda warnings “only in the aftermath of interrogation and just after making
a confession,” Mr. Godwin “would hardly think he had a genuine right to remain silent, let alone
persist in so believing once the police began to lead him over the same ground again.” Seibert,
542 U.S. at 613 (plurality opinion). “A more likely reaction on a suspect’s part would be
perplexity about the reason for discussing rights at that point, bewilderment being an
unpromising frame of mind for knowledgeable decision.” Id. And Mr. Godwin had this reaction.
He  told  Officer  Hewson  right  before  the  warnings,  “You  shouldn’t  be  reading  it  to  me  after  I
already said something.” (Inter. Tr., p.16, Ls.14-15.) Mr. Godwin’s own statements show the
ineffectiveness and inadequacy of the warnings. Absent any curative measures, or other Seibert
factors to separate the two interrogations, a reasonable person in Mr. Godwin’s position would
not have understood the delayed Miranda warnings “to convey a message that [ ]he retained a
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choice about continuing to talk.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616–17 (plurality opinion).
In conclusion, Officer Hewson used a deliberate two-step interrogation after the first
confession from Mr. Godwin. The delayed warnings did not cure the Miranda violation to
adequately and effectively inform Mr. Godwin of his Fifth Amendment protections. Therefore,
Mr. Godwin’s post-warning statements, just like his pre-warning statements, must be suppressed,
and the district court erred by denying his motion.
II.
The District Court Erred When It Ruled Mr. Godwin Could Only Present Opinion Or Reputation
Evidence Of Mr. Anderson’s Violent And/Or Aggressive Character After Showing That Mr.
Godwin Was Aware Of Mr. Anderson’s Propensity For Violence
A. Introduction
The district court erred when it prohibited Brandon Fisher and Billing Ellenberg from
testifying about specific instances of conduct unless proper foundation was laid to show that
Mr. Godwin was aware of Mr. Anderson’s propensity for violence, because the character
evidence  was  admissible  to  show that  Mr.  Anderson  was  acting  in  conformity  with  his  violent
and/or aggressive character, even if Mr. Godwin was not aware of Mr. Anderson’s reputation.
B. Standard Of Review
 “[T]he interpretation of a rule of evidence, like the interpretation of a statute, is reviewed
de novo.” State v. Hill, 161 Idaho 444, 447 (2016) (quoting State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821
(1998)).
C. The District Court Erred When It Ruled Mr. Godwin Could Only Present Opinion Or
Reputation Evidence Of Mr. Anderson’s Violent And/Or Aggressive Character After
Showing That Mr. Godwin Was Aware Of Mr. Anderson’s Propensity For Violence
In February of 2016, a Motion in Limine was filed by the State requesting that the district
court prohibit proposed defense witnesses Brandon Fisher and Billy Ellenberg from testifying
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“about specific instances of conduct showing that the deceased, Kyle Anderson, was violent and
aggressive.” (R., pp.544–547.) Each witness was expected to testify that Mr. Anderson had
pointed a gun at him. (R., p.544.)
After hearing the argument of both parties, the district court ruled that:
 . . . The general rule is that evidence of character is not admissible to prove
conduct at a specific incident, meaning propensity. There’s an exception to the
general rule that alleged that the defendant that was acting in self-defense in
certain instances to bring forth propensity but only can be made as to reputation
and opinion testimony is my reading of Custodio. And if you read the trial court
in Custodio, the trial court said that he had previously allowed opinion testimony
with reference to propensity for violence and reputation for the same. So, this
order does not bar that type of evidence from being introduced, if there’s a proper
foundation that the defendant in this case had knowledge of the same or it was
communicated to them . . . Evidence purporting to show Kyle Anderson’s
propensity to violence shall be presented only in the form of reputation or opinion
evidence. . . . Again, there will be a necessary requirement of foundation to allow
for the introduction of opinion testimony as to reputation or opinion.
(Tr., p.484, L.18–p.486, L.2 (emphasis added).) The Motion in Limine Order noted that specific
instances of conduct were prohibited and noted that “[e]vidence purporting to show Kyle
Anderson’s propensity to violence shall be presented only in the form of reputation or opinion
evidence.” (R., pp.700–01.)
Mr. Godwin asserts that the district court’s ruling that character evidence was admissible
to show that Mr. Anderson was acting in conformity with his violent and/or aggressive character
only if Mr. Godwin was aware of Mr. Anderson’s reputation is erroneous.
Rule 404(a) reads:
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
. . .
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
36
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor;
. . .
By its plain language, Rule 404(a) places limitations on when evidence of a “person’s character
or a trait of character” can be used to show “the person acted in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion,” but it does not, in and of itself, limit the use of such evidence for any other
purpose. Id. Rule 405 limits how evidence of an accused or victim’s character can be admitted
pursuant to Rule 404(a)(1) and (2):
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of the person’s conduct.
I.R.E. 405. Thus, Rules 404(a) and 405 define when and how a party may present evidence of a
person’s character only when such evidence is offered for the jury to consider whether the
person acted in conformity with that trait of character on a particular occasion.
This is contrary to Rule 404(b) which specifically allows the admission of evidence of a
person’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” for any purpose other than to prove that person acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, provided such evidence is relevant and not overly
prejudicial. This type of evidence is offered to explain the defendant’s state of mind when
committing the homicide. “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation,  plan,  knowledge,  identity,  or  absence  of  mistake  or  accident  .  .  .  .” I.R.E. 404(b).
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This list of permissible purposes is not exclusive, State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 501 (1999)
(citation omitted), and the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that a defendant claiming self-
defense may present evidence of the victim’s prior instances of violent conduct, provided the
defendant was aware of that conduct at the time of incident, because such evidence is relevant to
the defendant’s state of mind. See State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197, 205 (Ct. App. 2001); State v.
Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 584–85 (Ct. App. 1999).
In Hernandez, the Court of Appeals found that a defendant is not required to show that a
defendant had knowledge of the victim’s violent disposition, when character evidence of an
individual’s violent disposition is offered for the purpose of suggesting that the alleged victim
was the aggressor. Writing for a unanimous Court of Appeals in Hernandez, Judge Lansing
noted the differing evidentiary requirements:
When the evidence is offered to show conforming behavior by the victim, the
defendant need not show that he had prior knowledge of the victim’s violent
disposition,  for  whether  the  defendant  was  aware  of  the  victim’s  propensity  for
violence has no bearing upon the likelihood that the victim acted in conformity
with that propensity on a particular occasion. . . .
On the other hand, evidence of the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s
violent reputation or behavior is necessary foundation when character evidence is
offered to support a different element of the defense of self-defense or defense of
others—that the defendant reasonably feared the victim and reasonably believed
that the force used was necessary to repel the victim’s attack. When evidence of a
victim’s violent or aggressive nature is offered for this second purpose, the
evidence is admissible only if it is shown that the defendant was aware of the
victim’s violent character, for otherwise the defendant’s actions could not have
been influenced by it. It is worth observing that, when the evidence is used for
this second purpose, Rule 404(a) is entirely inapplicable because the character
evidence is not being offered “for the purpose of proving that the [victim] acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” . . .
Although it must be acknowledged that courts have often confused these
two purposes of victim character evidence, logic dictates that the defendant’s
awareness of the victim’s aggressiveness is irrelevant to the first purpose and is
essential to the relevance of the character evidence for the second purpose.
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133 Idaho at 584–85 (citations omitted).
Therefore, it is clear that under Rules 404 and 405, character evidence showing that
Mr. Anderson was violent and/or aggressive was admissible even if Mr. Godwin was not aware
of Mr. Anderson’s reputation. The district court erred when it denied Mr. Godwin the
opportunity to present evidence of the character of Mr. Anderson by requiring Mr. Godwin to
show that he had prior knowledge of Mr. Anderson’s reputation in order to satisfy the erroneous
foundational requirement for admissibility. Moreover, the State will be unable to prove the error
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
D. The State Will Be Unable To Prove, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, The District Court’s
Error Did Not Contribute To The Verdict
The harmless error doctrine has been defined by this Court: “To hold an error as
harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.” State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a
violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). The State will be unable to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the district court’s error in denying Mr. Godwin the opportunity
to present evidence of Mr. Anderson’s reputation for violence, unless he had prior knowledge of
his reputation, did not contribute to the guilty verdict. The only contested issue in Mr. Godwin’s
case was whether the killing of Mr. Anderson was justified or criminal. Certainly, evidence
supporting Mr. Godwin’s theory, that he acted in self-defense, would be of significant
importance. Prohibiting the presentation of evidence showing that Mr. Anderson had a reputation
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for violence and aggression limited the jury’s ability to properly weigh the evidence. As such,
the district court’s error was not harmless and this Court must vacate the conviction.
III.
This Court Should Overrule State v. Custodio And Hold Specific Instances Of A Victim’s
Conduct, Showing A Violent Character, Can Be An Essential Element Of A Self-Defense Claim
And Are Admissible Under Idaho Rule Of Evidence 405
A.  Introduction
Mr. Godwin recognizes a line of cases which have held specific instances of a victim’s
conduct are not admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 405(b) because a victim’s propensity
for violence or aggressiveness does not constitute an essential element of a self-defense claim.
See State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197 (Ct. App. 2001). However, he asserts this line of cases are
incorrectly decided and are patently unfair to criminal defendants. Accordingly, he respectfully
asks this Court to either revisit and overturn this line of cases, if assigned to the Court of
Appeals, or to decline to follow the cases, if assigned the Idaho Supreme Court, and to hold that
under Rule 405(b) specific instances of a victim’s violent or aggressive conduct can be
admissible  as  proof  of  their  character  and  can  constitute  an  essential  element  of  a  self-defense
claim. Mr. Godwin contends if  this Court  does so,  it  should reverse his conviction and remand
this case for a new trial involving proper application of Rule 405(b).
B. Standard Of Review
“[T]he interpretation of a rule of evidence, like the interpretation of a statute, is reviewed
de novo.” Hill, 161 Idaho at 447 (quoting Moore, 131 Idaho at 821).
C. This Court Should Overrule State v. Custodio And Hold Specific Instances Of A Victim’s
Conduct, Showing A Violent Character, Can Be An Essential Element Of A Self-Defense
Claim And Are Admissible Under Idaho Rule Of Evidence 405
Mr. Godwin respectfully contends that Custodio and its progeny were fundamentally
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flawed and unfair when they were decided, and that they remain so today.10 It is well recognized
that the doctrine of stare decisis need not be strictly adhered to if the precedent in question is
manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or if overruling it is necessary to
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. State v. Humphreys,
134 Idaho 657, 660 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77
(1990)). Accordingly, he respectfully requests Custodio be overruled and this Court hold under
Rule 405(b) specific instances of a victim’s violent or aggressive conduct can be admissible as
proof of their character and can constitute an essential element of a self-defense claim.
In the case at hand, the State filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the district court
prohibit proposed defense witnesses Mr. Fisher and Mr. Ellenberg from testifying “about specific
instances of conduct showing that the deceased, Kyle Anderson, was violent and aggressive.”
(R., pp.544–47.) Each witness was expected to testify that Mr. Anderson had, on separate
occasions, pointed a gun at him. (R., p.544.) The State relied on State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197
(Ct. App. 2001), for its position that “specific instances of conduct may not be presented to aid a
defendant  in  his  claim  of  self-defense,  or  to  show  that  the  victim  was  the  first  aggressor.”
(R., pp.544–47.)
At the hearing on the Motion in Limine, defense counsel argued that “the current
interpretation of Idaho Rule of Evidence ought to be overturned or disavowed . . .” (Tr., p.482,
10 Counsel is only aware of one unpublished decision following Custodio’s holding in the State
of Idaho, State v. Guel, Supreme Court Docket Number 38149, Idaho Court of Appeals, 2012
Unpublished Opinion No.655 (October 3, 2012). Mr. Godwin recognizes this is an unpublished
opinion and is not to be cited as authority because it is neither case law nor binding precedent.
See Internal Rule of the Idaho Supreme Court 15(f). However, the district court relied, in part, on
Guel in issuing its decision in the case at hand. Accordingly, Mr. Godwin is merely citing to this
case to both explain the district court’s ruling and to illustrate the fact that Custodio is the
beginning of a line of cases with similar holdings.
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Ls.7–8.) Counsel noted Mr. Fisher and Mr. Ellenberg “would testify about specific prior acts of
the decedent which are identical to the conduct the decedent is alleged to have done leading up to
his death.  .  .  .  not just  similar acts,  .  .  .  it’s  an identical  act  of pulling a weapon on someone.”
(Tr., p.482, Ls.20–24.) Defense counsel represented Mr. Ellenberg “would testify that just two
weeks prior to his death Kyle Anderson pulled a handgun on him.” (Tr., p.483, Ls.1–3.)
Mr. Fisher would testify in the winter of 2013 “he was looking for an individual and went to a
house where Kyle Anderson was staying” and Mr. Anderson pointed his gun at him. (Tr., p.483,
Ls.3–7.)
In response to defense counsel’s request that the opinion in Custodio be overturned or
disavowed, the district court noted, “[w]hile I am tempted to do that, there are other states that
have a much broader view”, it was bound by precedent.11 (Tr., p.483, L.17–p.484, L.7.) The
district court ruled as follows:
So, it is the opinion of this Court that Counsel is basically asking the Court to
prevent defense witnesses Fisher and Ellenberg from testifying as to specific acts
that they alleged occurred with reference to Kyle Anderson pointing a gun at them
in the past. It’s clear that those – that testimony would be introduced for the
purpose of showing that Kyle Anderson was either a violent or aggressive person.
Was the initial aggressor or otherwise. This is covered by basically two rules, as
reading Custodio,  or  multiple  rules.  The  first  one  would  be  404(a)(2)  which
regards character of the victim. The general rule is that evidence of character is
not admissible to prove conduct at a specific incident, meaning propensity.
There’s an exception to the general rule that alleged that the defendant that was
acting in self-defense in certain instances to bring forth propensity but only can be
made as to reputation and opinion testimony is my reading of Custodio. . . .
however, specific evidence of instances of conduct can only be introduced as
direct evidence if it falls under Rule 404(b). And the Court in Custodio found that
evidence of specific instances of violent conduct were not admissible under
404(b) to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, knowledge, plan, or
absence of mistake. Under the Custodio analysis, specific instances of Kyle
Anderson’ alleged violent conduct are not admissible evidence. Therefore, it’s
11 The district  court  noted it  had “read Custodio and Gould and read all  other cases relating to
this.” (Tr., p.483, Ls.15–17.) Throughout the hearing, Guel was mistakenly referred to as
“Gould”.
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this Court’s order that any statements or references to specific instances in which
Kyle Anderson pointed a gun at any witness shall be prohibited during voir dire
. . . , opening statements, the trial, and closing arguments. Evidence purporting to
show Kyle Anderson’s propensity to violence shall be presented only in the form
of reputation or opinion evidence.
(Tr., p.484, L.8–p.485, L.22.)
Mr. Godwin acknowledges the district court’s decision regarding the admissibility of
specific instances of a victims conduct was proper based upon currently controlling precedent.
However, he asserts, as he did during trial, such precedent is both unjust and unwise and should
now be overturned or disavowed.
1. Current Idaho Law And Its Origins
Under  Idaho  Rule  of  Evidence  404(a)  character  evidence  is  admissible  to  prove  that  a
victim acted consistently with their propensity for violence or aggression.   Under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 405 provides:
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of the person’s conduct.
Consequently, it is also clear victim character evidence is admissible by means reputation or
opinion. Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 584–85. However, Rule 405(b) also allows for the admission
of specific instances of conduct when a character trait is an “essential element” of a claim or
defense. As such, the disputed issue is whether a victim’s propensity for violence or aggression
is an essential element of a claim of self-defense.
In 1995, in United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed this issue. The Court noted:
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[W]e conduct our Rule 405 inquiry according to the terms of the Rule itself,
which  requires  courts  to  determine  whether  the  character  a  party  seeks  to  prove
constitutes  “an  essential  element  of  a  charge,  claim,  or  defense.”  Fed.R.Evid.
405(b). The relevant question should be: would proof, or failure of proof, of the
character trait by itself actually satisfy an element of the charge, claim, or
defense? If not, then character is not essential and evidence should be limited to
opinion or reputation.
Keiser, 57 F.3d at 856 (footnote omitted). The Court went on to hold a victim’s violent character
does  not  constitute  an  essential  element  of  a  self-defense  claim as  the  claim “neither  rises  nor
falls on [the] success in proving that [a victim] has a penchant for violent outbursts.” Id. at 857.
In 2001, this issue was addressed for the first time in Idaho by the Court of Appeals in
Custodio. Relying exclusively on Keiser, the Court held specific instances of conduct were not
admissible as proof a victim’s propensity for violence as propensity for violence is not an
essential element of a claim of self-defense. Custodio, 136 Idaho at 204. The Court concluded
“[p]roof  of  a  victim’s  propensity  for  violence,  standing  alone,  does  not  prove  an  element  of  a
claim of self-defense. Proof of a victim’s violent character does not show that the victim was the
first aggressor in a particular conflict, nor does proof of a victim’s passive demeanor foreclose
the defendant from asserting a claim of self-defense.” Id.
In 2012, the issue was addressed again in an unpublished opinion from the Court of
Appeals in Guel. The Court in Guel affirmed the holding of Custodio and specifically declined
the request to overrule Custodio.
As such, the current law in Idaho deems evidence related to a victim’s character for
violence or aggression as admissible through opinion or reputation evidence only and holds
specific instances of conduct inadmissible because the relevant character traits are not an
“essential  element”  of  the  claim  or  defense.  Nonetheless,  Mr.  Godwin  maintains  the
Custodio/Keiser interpretation thwarts the just administration of justice and should either be
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overturned or disavowed. Instead, he argues for a more broad interpretation of Rule 405.
2. An Alternative Interpretation Of Rule 405(b)
While a number jurisdictions follow an application of a Keiser analysis, prohibiting the
presentation of specific instances of conduct evidence to prove a victim’s character regarding
propensity for violence or aggression,12 other jurisdictions allow the presentation of the specific
acts evidence. Mr. Godwin asserts that underlying concerns which prompted these jurisdictions
to allow the admission of specific acts evidence are important, compelling, and counsel toward a
broader interpretation of Rule 405(b) in Idaho.
When the circumstances of the altercation are disputed, it is widely accepted that
evidence revealing a victim’s propensity for violence has significant probative value and assists
the jury in determining who was the first aggressor. State v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d. 1 (Mass.
2005); 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 63, at 467 (3d ed. 1940). In Adjutant, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held when evidence concerning a victim’s reputation for violence or
aggressiveness was admissible for purposes of determining who was the first aggressor in a self-
defense case, the preference was for “the admission of concrete and relevant evidence of specific
acts over more general evidence of the victim’s reputation for violence.” 824 N.E.2d. at 14. The
Court expressed a strong desire to supply the jury with “as complete a picture of the (often fatal)
altercation as possible before deciding a defendant’s guilt[.]” Id. It commented that specific act
evidence was more compelling, although it could be more problematic than reputation or opinion
evidence:
Jurisdictions that exclude the victim’s specific acts of violence and admit
reputation evidence make that choice because reputation evidence is filtered,
12 See State v. Jenewicz, 940 A.2d 269, 280–81 (N.J. 2008); State v. Williams, 685 P.2d 764, 766
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1983); McClellan v. State,
570 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ark. 1978); State v. Alexander, 765 P.2d 321, 324 (Wash. 1988).
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general in nature, with less potential to inflame or sidetrack the proceedings than
evidence of the victim’s specific acts—in essence, because such evidence is less
“convincing” and thus less controversial.
Id.
The Court addressed concerns about admitting specific act evidence, but ultimately found
that concerns that a jury would be “distracted by information about the victim’s unrelated prior
violence” were unfounded. Id. at 9. The Court noted that if juries are capable of evaluating
similar evidence for the limited purpose of determining the reasonableness of a defendant's
apprehension of the victim, they are likewise capable of weighing evidence relevant to the first
aggressor issue. Id. Other concerns included:
(1) the danger of ascribing character traits to a victim with proof of isolated
incidents, (2) the worry that jurors will be invited to acquit the defendant on the
improper ground that the victim deserved to die, (3) the potential for wasting time
trying collateral questions surrounding the victim's past conduct, (4) the unfair
difficulty of rebuttal by the prosecution, and (5) the strategic imbalance that flows
from the inability of prosecutors to introduce similar evidence of the defendant's
prior bad acts.
Id. at 11.
However, after considering these additional concerns, the Court found they did not weigh
in favor of a rule prohibiting the admission of all specific act evidence. Id. at 12. Instead, it
remarked on the importance of such evidence in self-defense cases; “[t]estimony about the
victim’s prior acts of violence can be convincing and reliable evidence of the victim’s propensity
for violence.” Id. The Court also discussed the principle that there should be greater latitude in
admitting exculpatory evidence and noted the risk is truly to the defendant as the real danger of
prejudice lies in refusing to admit such evidence. Id. at 10. After all, when there is conflicting
testimony about who was armed and at what point, specific act evidence “may be the jury’s only
means of assessing the likelihood of the defendant’s account of the incident.” Id. at 3 n.1. It was
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determined the trial court was capable of evaluating the specific act evidence, limiting the
evidence to that which was non-cumulative and relevant, and mitigating any dangers of prejudice
by instructing the jury about the precise purpose of the evidence, alleviating any juror
misunderstanding. Id. at 12-13.
The State of Massachusetts is not an outlier in admitting specific act evidence as proof of
a victim’s propensity for violence or aggressiveness. See Heidel v. State, 587 So. 2d 835, 844–46
(Miss. 1991) (holding under Rule 405(b) a victim’s propensity for violence became an essential
element of the defendant’s defense when he claimed self-defense and allowing the admission of
specific instances of conduct); State v. Sims, 331 N.W.2d 255, 258–59 (Neb. 1983) (holding,
under a Nebraska statute with language identical to Idaho Rule 405, specific act evidence
demonstrating that the victim had a propensity for violence was admissible to show the victim
was the initial aggressor due to defendant’s claim of self-defense claim); State v. McIntyre, 488
N.W.2d 612, 616 (N.D. 1992) (finding victim’s acts admissible to corroborate other evidence
that victim was the aggressor); State v. Dunson, 433 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 1988) (holding
specific instances of conduct, occurring subsequent to assault for which defendant was charged,
were admissible to show victim's propensity for violence in support of defendant's self-defense
claim); Henderson v. State, 583 So.2d 276, 289 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (victim's acts admissible
where conflicting accounts of who was the aggressor); Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140,
144 (D.C. Ct. App. 1992) (victim’s acts admissible only in homicide cases); People v. Rowland,
69 Cal. Rptr. 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (Evidence of aggressive and violent character by specific
acts of the victim on third person is admissible in homicide case where self-defense is raised as
defense.); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 222 S.E.2d 573, 577 (Va. 1976) (“We follow the rule that
an accused, producing evidence that he acted in self-defense, may show specific incidents of
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prior violent conduct on the part of the victim to establish the character of the victim for
turbulence and violence for the purpose of corroborating his testimony, even though such trait is
unknown to the accused.”); State v. Adam, 38 P.3d 581, 585–86 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]hen
the factual issue is, as between the defendant and the other person, who was the aggressor, the
defendant may introduce evidence of the other person’s violent or aggressive character.” The
Court treated opinion or reputation character evidence and specific prior acts (including those
reflected in the victim's criminal record) the same for purposes of corroborating a defendant's
self-defense claim as to who was the initial aggressor.); People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018,
1019–21 (Ill. 1984) (victim’s acts admissible where conflicting accounts of who was the
aggressor.).
Other jurisdictions do not limit first aggressor evidence to only opinion or reputation, but
also  allow the  admission  of  relevant  convictions. See State v. Miranda, 405 A.2d 622, 624–25
(Conn. 1978) (in a homicide prosecution, where the accused has claimed self-defense, the
defendant may show the deceased was the initial aggressor by proving the deceased’s alleged
character for violence. “The deceased’s character may be proved by reputation testimony, by
opinion testimony, or by evidence of the deceased's convictions of crimes of violence,
irrespective of whether the accused knew of the deceased's violent character or of the particular
evidence adduced at the time of the death-dealing encounter.”); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 96
(Utah 1982) (victim’s convictions admissible to show victim was the aggressor).
Yet, other jurisdictions find specific act evidence showing a victim’s propensity for
violence or aggression is so compelling admission is guaranteed through the state’s rules of
evidence. In Wyoming, Rule 405(b) was modified to allow victim's acts to show victim was the
aggressor: “(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character
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of  a  person  is  an  essential  element  of  a  charge,  claim,  or  defense,  or  is  in  issue  under  Rule
404(a)(2), proof may also be made of specific instances of his conduct.” Wyo. R. Evid. 405(B).
Similarly, California’s relevant rule also specifically allows for the admission of specific
instances of conduct:
(a)  In  a  criminal  action,  evidence  of  the  character  or  a  trait  of  character  (in  the
form  of  an  opinion,  evidence  of  reputation,  or  evidence  of  specific  instances  of
conduct) of the victim of the crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted is
not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is:
(1) Offered by the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in conformity with the
character or trait of character.
. . .
Cal. Evid. Code § 1103.
As shown in other jurisdictions, prior acts that demonstrate a propensity for initiating
violence can be very significant to the first aggressor issue and their number can be controlled by
the trial court’s discretion. Conversely, reputation or opinions are often formed based on rumor
or other unreliable hearsay sources, without any personal knowledge on the part of the person
holding that opinion. Mr. Godwin assert the rigid rule articulated in Custodio renders Rule
405(b)  a  nullity,  as  it  applies  to  defenses  as  a  victim’s  specific  act  evidence  can  never  be
admissible for a self-defense claim. Yet, there is grave danger when courts limit the presentation
of exculpatory evidence. Mr. Godwin asserts that this danger requires a broader reading of Rule
405(b). In evaluating specific act evidence under Rule 405(b) the analysis should not end with a
rigid rule that prohibits the presentation of specific act evidence in all self-defense cases. When
the  “essential  element”  phase  is  evaluated  with  respect  to  a  crime,  the  court  looks  to  the
indictment or information and the inquiry would be legal and categorical. However when looking
at a defense, the analysis cannot be as definitive. It must be factual and particular to the case at
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hand. In some cases, specific act evidence may not be an “essential element.” However, in some
cases the evidence is unquestionably essential to the presentation of a self-defense claim.
In the case at hand, the evidence of what occurred, as is often the case, is both incomplete
and conflicting. The specific act evidence illuminates the crucial question at the heart of
Mr. Godwin’s self-defense claim—who threatened violence with a gun first in the moments prior
to the fatal shooting. Evidence that Mr. Anderson had used a gun to threaten individuals that
approached his property or person shows a pattern of behavior that would have supported the
inference that Mr. Anderson probably acted in conformity with his history of aggression by also
pulling a gun on Mr. Godwin, and that the defendant’s story of self-defense was truthful. As
such, his is a case where the presentation of specific act evidence was essential to his defense.
Mr. Godwin requests that this Court overrule Custodio and employ a broader rule when a
defendant claims self-defense.
3. Excluding Specific Act Character Evidence Under Rule 405(b) Effectively
Deprives Defendants Of Their Fourteenth Amendment Right To A Fair Trial By
Precluding A Meaningful Opportunity To Fully Present A Self-Defense Claim
In addition to denying the admission of specific act evidence under Rule 405(b), the
district court effectively deprived Mr. Godwin of his constitutional right to present his defense.
In acknowledging the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process applies to the States though
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
The  right  to  offer  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  and  to  compel  their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right
to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the
jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to
confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their
testimony,  he  has  the  right  to  present  his  own  witnesses  to  establish  a  defense.
This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). While a defendant does not have an unfettered
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right  to  present  any  evidence  he  wishes,  evidentiary rules cannot be used in such a way to
deprive a defendant of his basic right to present a defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 294–95 (1973). “Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present
witnesses in his own defense . . . .” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 US 400, 407 (1988) (citing Chambers,
410 US at 302). Thus, if application of rules of evidence deprives a criminal defendant of a fair
opportunity to defend against the charge, the conviction cannot stand. Chambers, 410 U.S. at
302–03.
Evidence of Mr. Anderson’s character, specifically that he had pulled a gun two other
individuals in similar situations, was evidence essential to Mr. Godwin’s defense. The case at
hand largely hinges on credibility. At the time of Mr. Anderson’s death, only a handful
individuals were present and able to observe the events that transpired. Of these witnesses,
Ms. Jones testified Mr. Anderson had a gun on his person, but it was not in his hand when
Mr. Godwin shot him. (Tr., p.580, Ls.14–22.) When asked what Mr. Anderson had in his hand
when Mr. Godwin pulled up she had difficulty remembering, testifying “he had the license plate
in his hand” (Tr., p.581, Ls.12–14), he had a screwdriver in his hand (Tr., p.607, Ls.2–13), and
that she “didn’t pay attention” (Tr., p.583, Ls.4–10.) Mr. Lynch testified at trial that he did not
see Mr. Anderson pull a gun. (Tr., p.714, L.5–p.715, L.2.) However, he told police that both
Mr. Anderson and Mr. Godwin had guns drawn. (Tr., p.724, L.13–p.725, L.15.) Mr. Ruiz
testified that Mr. Anderson did not have a gun in his hand. (Tr., p.764, L.5–p.765, L.4, p.767,
Ls.1–8.) Conversely, Mr. Godwin was consistent that Mr. Anderson had pulled a gun and that
the killing was in self-defense. (Tr., p.1063, L.6–p.1064, L.18, p.1111. Ls.3–20; State’s Exhibits
68, 69.)
It is clear the jury would have benefitted from hearing evidence about Mr. Anderson’s
51
character, specifically his propensity for violence and aggression. In this case, the jury was
deprived of that evidence both in the form of opinion or reputation, as discussed in Issue II, and
through testimony about specific instances of conduct. The jury was entitled to hear this relevant
and probative evidence. In United States. v. Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974), the Court observed:
We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the
parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant
facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of
criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or
speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and
public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within
the framework of the rules of evidence.
Id. at 709.
Interpreting Rules 404 and 405, as in Custodio, suggests the rules of evidence were
intended to systematically deprive a murder defendant the ability to present specific instances of
the victim’s conduct, even where those instances are especially relevant, probative, and may
provide the only means for a defendant to prove his account of the events, i.e. to prove his
innocence. Opinion and reputation evidence, while relevant and admissible, see IRE 404(a)(2),
405(a), cannot substitute for the admission of direct and compelling evidence supporting a
defense. Idaho’s current interpretation of Rules 404 and 405 is inconsistent with basic notions of
due process and by depriving Mr. Godwin of his ability to present this evidence, the district court
also deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
IV.
The District Court’s Failure To Instruct The Jury On Justifiable Homicide Pursuant To I.C. § 18-
4009(1) Amounted To Fundamental Error
A. Introduction
Mr. Godwin asserts the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on justifiable homicide
constituted fundamental error.
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B. Standard Of Review
“This Court reviews jury instructions to ascertain whether, when considered as a whole,
they fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law.” State v. Mann, 162
Idaho 36, 40 (2017) (quoting State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472 (2012)). “Whether the trial
court properly instructed the jury presents a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review.” State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 905 (2004). Unobjected-to errors are reviewed for
fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. Under that doctrine, the defendant has the burden to
show an error in violation of one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights, the
error must plainly exist, and the error must not be harmless. Id.
C. A Reasonable View Of The Evidence Required A Separate Jury Instruction On
Justifiable Homicide Pursuant To I.C. § 18-4009(1)
Idaho Code § 18-4009 describes four scenarios in which homicide is justified, and it
reads in relevant part:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in either of the
following cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to
do some great bodily injury upon any person; or,
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property or person, against one who
manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or
against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or
tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering
violence to any person therein; or,
3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a wife or husband,
parent, child, master, mistress or servant of such person, when there is reasonable
ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily
injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; but such person,
or  the  person  in  whose  behalf  the  defense  was  made,  if  he  was  the  assailant  or
engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to
decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed . . . .
I.C. § 18-4009 (subsection (4) is not relevant to this appeal). By its plain language, the statute
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describes four separate scenarios in which a homicide may be justifiable. See State v. Owens, 158
Idaho 1, 3 (2015) (“Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language.”). If the
homicide is justifiable under any of the four scenarios, “the person indicted must, upon his trial,
be fully acquitted and discharged.” I.C. § 18-4013.
At issue here is the first scenario of justifiable homicide, Subsection (1). The jury was not
specifically instructed on this scenario as a lawful justification for Mr. Anderson’s death. Rather,
the jury received instructions consistent with self-defense under Subsection (3). (See Jury
Instrs.,13 pp.24–27.) Mr. Godwin submits the failure to instruct the jury on Subsection (1) was in
error. The plain language of Subsection (1) establishes a separate legal justification for homicide
in response to an actual, ongoing attack. This justification is distinct from self-defense in that it
does not require the homicide to be solely motivated by an objectively reasonable fear. Further,
this Court’s recent decision in Hall supports giving a separate instruction on justifiable homicide
under Subsection (1) if warranted by a reasonable view of the evidence. The evidence here
required a separate Subsection (1) instruction.
1. I.C. § 18-4009(1) Renders A Homicide Justifiable If The Person Was Resisting
An Actual, Ongoing Attack—Even If The Person’s Fear Was Objectively
Unreasonable And Not The Sole Motivation For Action
Subsection (1) provides that a homicide is justified when in response to an attempt (a) “to
murder any person,” (b) “to commit a felony,” or (c) “do some great bodily injury upon any
person.” I.C. § 18-4009(1). Thus, under Subsection (1), the homicide is justifiable if the person is
resisting an actual, ongoing attack to murder or do great bodily injury. See Hall, 161 Idaho at
418, 423.
13 The jury instructions are contained in a separate document in the record, “Godwin Appeal-Jury
Instructions.pdf,” and will be cited to separately with the internal pagination from this document.
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Unlike  Subsection  (1),  the  subsequent  statute  in  the  Idaho  Code  explicitly  modifies
justifiable homicides pursuant to Subsections (2) and (3). Idaho Code § 18-4010 reads:
A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned in subdivisions 2
and 3 of the preceding section, to prevent which homicide may be lawfully
committed, is not sufficient to justify it. But the circumstances must be sufficient
to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing must have acted
under the influence of such fears alone.
I.C. § 18-4010 (emphasis added). Under this statute, where the homicide is committed in
response to an anticipated attack as described in Subsection (2) or (3), a bare fear of the
commission of the offense is not sufficient, the fear must be objectively reasonable, and the
killing must have been motivated solely by those objectively reasonable fears. I.C. §§ 18-
4009(2)–(3); -4010. Reading I.C. §§ 18-4009 and 18-4010 together, the Idaho legislature
distinguishes between homicides committed in response to an actual, on-going attack, where
there is neither a reasonableness nor a fear requirement (Subsection (1)) and homicides
committed in response to anticipated attacks, where a defendant must be act solely out of an
objectively reasonable fear (Subsections (2) and (3)). I.C. §§ 18-4009, -4010.
This Court recently confirmed this interpretation of I.C. § 18-4009(1) in Hall. 161 Idaho
at 418–25. In Hall, the defendant argued the district court erred by refusing his proposed
instruction on justifiable homicide under Subsection (1). Id. at 419–20. This Court held the
defendant’s instructional error was not preserved and thus reviewed the issue under the
fundamental error standard. Id. at 422–25. In doing so, the Court recognized:
The reason it is an issue [for failing to instruct on Subsection (1)] is that Idaho
Code section 18-4010 does not apply to that subsection, so there is no requirement
that “the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable
person, and the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears
alone.”
Id. at 418; see also id. at 420 n.3 (“Idaho Code section 18-4010 does not apply to justifiable
homicide committed under the circumstance set forth in subsection (1) of Idaho Code section 18-
55
4009.”) The Hall Court also agreed with the defendant’s position that Subsection (1) “describes
an actual, ongoing attack.” Id. at 423. Later on, in denying the defendant’s petition for rehearing,
the Court reiterated, “As we held in the opinion, for [Subsection (1)] to apply the defendant must
have been resisting an actual, ongoing attack.” Id. at 429 (petition for rehearing order). The
Court also acknowledged Subsection (3) pertained to self-defense, which must be solely
motivated by an objectively reasonable fear. Id. at 430–31 (petition for rehearing order) (holding
that the standard self-defense instructions are correct statements of the law under Subsection (3)
and accompanying case law). Therefore, this Court’s recent decision in Hall confirmed the
separate scenarios for justifiable homicide in I.C. § 18-4009. Subsection (1) requires an actual,
ongoing attack, while Subsection (3) does not. Conversely, Subsection (3) requires an
objectively reasonable fear and action solely motivated by that fear, while Subsection (1) does
not. These distinct requirements for each scenario create separate justifications for homicide.
2. A Reasonable View Of The Evidence Supported An Instruction On Justifiable
Homicide Pursuant To I.C. § 18-4009(1) Because The Evidence Showed
Mr. Godwin Was Resisting An Actual, Ongoing Attack From Mr. Anderson
Based on the evidence presented, the jury could have found Mr. Anderson attacked
Mr. Godwin with the intent to inflict death or serious bodily injury and Mr. Godwin shot
Mr. Anderson to resist that attack. The evidence therefore supported a Subsection (1) instruction.
At trial, there was no dispute that Mr. Anderson had a gun on him at the time of his death.
Ms. Jones testified that she saw Mr. Anderson’s gun on him that evening. (Tr., p.578, Ls.20–24,
p.579, Ls.21–23, p.603, Ls.20–23.) Ms. Jones said that she saw the gun falling out of
Mr. Anderson’s shorts, so she told him to put in the back pocket of his vest. (Tr., p.578, L.25–
p.580, L.4, p.615, Ls.6–12.) Moments before Mr. Godwin arrived, Ms. Jones testified that she
felt Mr. Anderson’s gun in the back of his vest. (Tr., p.580, Ls.5–25.)
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Mr. Godwin also saw Mr. Anderson’s gun—Mr. Anderson pulled his gun out of his vest
or waistband, pointed it at Mr. Godwin, and cocked the hammer. Mr. Godwin testified that, as he
pulled up to the motorhome, Mr. Anderson, “just started, you know, after us. I mean, walking
real fast towards us. And then I seen him pull – pull the gun (indicating) out of his waistband.”
(Tr., p.1063, Ls.6–12.) Mr. Godwin further testified:
Q. When you saw that [Mr. Anderson pull the gun], what did you think was
happening?
A. Well, I got scared. What the Hell, you know. It was – because we just pulled
up. It was just that fast. So, I grabbed my pistol. It’s in – the little 380, and it was
right here in the seat. I shook the scabbard off, the holster, and I’m looking at him
telling him, don’t, don’t. And he cocked the hammer as I’m yelling at him: Drop
the gun, don’t, don’t pull that gun, something to that effect. It was just that fast.
And he cocked that hammer back, and I went like that (indicating).
Q. When you say you went like that (indicating) did you pull the trigger
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. Because he was going to shoot me. That’s all I could see.
Q. At that point did you think you were in immediate danger of getting shot?
A. Yeah. I was pretty darn scared. You know, it didn’t look like he was, you
know, just going to say hi. It looked like he was rushing up there, you know, to
shoot us, shoot me, or somebody.
Q. Was there any other reason, aside from saying to yourself that you pulled the
trigger?
A. No.
Q. Did you think it was necessary to pull the trigger to save yourself?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Why?
A. Because I was scared, scared for my life.
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Q. What happened after?
A. It was – it was – it was, you know, torment. We got out. I got out. I seen that
he dropped right there, and you know I looked over and Amanda is on the ground
behind the motorhome. This was – where he dropped was on the side of the
motorhome, kind of in front of my door, a little back towards – way – because I
went like this (indicating). I still had my foot on the brake when I shot him. I
didn’t get time to even get the rig out of gear.
Q. How fast did it happen?
A. A split second. I mean, it was fast. I mean, I couldn’t believe it. . . .
(Tr., p.1063, L.13–p.1065, L.5 (emphasis added).) On cross-examination, Mr. Godwin testified
Mr. Anderson pulled on a gun on him. (Tr., p.1093, L.20–p.1094, L.4.) Similarly, on redirect
examination, he confirmed Mr. Anderson “came at [him] immediately with a gun” and he
believed he was “in immediate danger of getting shot or getting killed.” (Tr., p.1111, Ls.3–9.)
Mr. Godwin’s testimony of Mr. Anderson’s actual,  ongoing attack is entirely consistent
with his statements during Officer Hewson’s interrogation. The State played the audio recording
of the interrogation for the jury. (Tr., p.848, Ls.9–10, p.851, Ls.7–9; State’s Exs. 68, 69.) In the
interrogation, Mr. Godwin repeatedly told Officer Hewson that he pulled up to the motorhome,
Mr. Anderson pulled a gun on him, and Mr. Godwin shot him in response. (Inter. Tr.,14 p.9,
Ls.16–19, p.14, Ls.23–25, p.16, Ls.4–5, p.18, Ls.12–14, p.22, Ls.13–14, p.23, Ls.19–21, p.27,
Ls.8–10, p.36, Ls.6–9, p.38, Ls.12–13, p.39, Ls.10–12, p.39, Ls.20–23, p.41, Ls.18–19, p.47,
Ls.22–25.)
Unlike Mr. Godwin’s unequivocal testimony of Mr. Anderson pulling a gun on him,
Ms.  Jones’s  testimony  was  inconsistent.  She  testified,  when  Mr.  Godwin  drove  up  to  their
14 For  ease  of  reference,  Mr.  Godwin  cites  to  the  Interrogation  Transcript,  as  opposed  to  the
minutes and seconds of the audio recording in State’s Exhibits 68 and 69. Exhibits 68 and 69
mirror the interrogation transcript, except that State’s Exhibit 68 redacted two discussions of
Mr. Godwin’s criminal history. (See Inter. Tr., p.13, L.25–p.14, L.9, p.34, Ls.18–25.)
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motorhome, Mr. Anderson first had a license plate in his hand, then nothing in his hand, and
finally a screwdriver in his hand. (Tr., p.581, Ls.12–14, p.583, Ls.2–3, p.583, Ls.4–6.) After that,
she testified she did not know if Mr. Anderson had anything in his hand. (Tr., p.583, Ls.7–10,
p.605, L.25–p.607, L.13.) Mr. Godwin, however, never changed his story on the gun in
Mr. Anderson’s hand. Along with the gun, Mr. Anderson had a significant amount of
methamphetamine in his blood at the time of his death. (Tr., p.658, L.8–p.660, L.8.)
In light of this evidence, a jury instruction on justifiable homicide under Subsection (1)
was fully warranted. The jury could have found Mr. Anderson pulled a gun on Mr. Godwin as he
drove up, started rushing towards Mr. Godwin, and cocked the hammer. This was an actual,
ongoing attack to kill or do great bodily injury to Mr. Godwin, and Mr. Godwin’s shooting of
Mr. Anderson was in response to that actual, ongoing attack. Therefore, the evidence presented
supported a separate Subsection (1) instruction.
D. The Self-Defense Instructions Given To The Jury Were Inadequate To Instruct The Jury
On The Separate Justifiable Homicide Pursuant To I.C. § 18-4009(1)
The instructions in this case failed to inform the jury of the separate scenario of
justifiable homicide pursuant to I.C. § 18-4009(1). The jury was instructed only on self-defense,
which falls under a different scenario of justifiable homicide pursuant to I.C. § 18-4009(3). The
district court gave four self-defense instructions.15 The district court instructed the jury:
Instruction No. 20
The  defendant  contends  as  a  defense  in  this  case  that  the  killing  was
justifiable because the defendant was acting in self-defense.
Under Idaho law, homicide is justifiable if committed while resisting an
attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily
injury upon any person.
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
15 Because  trial  counsel  proposed  these  instructions,  Mr.  Godwin  does  not  challenge  them  on
appeal as incorrect statements of the law on self-defense.
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the homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the
homicide was justifiable, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Instruction No. 21
A homicide is justifiable if the defendant was acting in self-defense.
In order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of the
following conditions must be found to have been in existence at the time of the
killing:
1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm.
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed that the
action the defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from the danger
presented.
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable person, under
similar circumstances, would have believed that the defendant was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily injury and believed that the action taken was
necessary.
4. The defendant must have acted only in response to that danger and not
for some other motivation.
In deciding upon the reasonableness of the defendant’s beliefs, you should
determine what an ordinary and reasonable person might have concluded from all
the facts and circumstances which the evidence shows existed at that time, and not
with the benefit of hindsight.
The danger must have been present and imminent, or must have so
appeared to a reasonable person under the circumstances. A bare fear of death or
great bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a homicide. The defendant must have
acted under the influence of fears that only a reasonable person would have had in
a similar position.
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the
homicide was justifiable, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Instruction No. 22
The kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully use in self-
defense are limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation as such a
person, seeing what the person sees and knowing what the person knows, then
would believe to be necessary. Any use of force beyond that is regarded by the
law as excessive. Although a person may believe that the person is acting, and
may act, in self-defense, the person is not justified in using a degree of force




In the exercise of the right of self-defense,  one need not retreat.  One my
stand one’s ground and defend oneself by the use of all force and means which
would  appear  to  be  necessary  to  a  reasonable  person  in  a  similar  situation  with
similar knowledge. This law applies even though the person being attacked might
more easily have gained safety by flight or by withdrawing from the scene.
(Jury Instrs., pp.24–27.) For a number of reasons, these instructions failed to instruct the jury on
justifiable homicide pursuant to I.C. § 18-4009(1).
For one, the conditions the jury must find to determine Mr. Godwin acted in self-defense
are inconsistent with justifiable homicide pursuant to Subsection (1). Instruction No. 21 first tells
the jury to find “the defendant must have believed that the defendant was in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm.” (Jury Instrs., p.25 (emphasis added).) This instruction simply does
not apply to circumstances where the defendant is actually suffering an “actual, ongoing attack”
to do great bodily harm, as required for justifiable homicide in Subsection (1). Rather, it applies
only where the defendant believes an attack is imminent, which is required for self-defense
pursuant to Subsection (3). I.C. § 18-4009(3) (“and imminent danger of such design being
accomplished”). Second, Instruction No. 21 requires “that the action the defendant took was
necessary to save the defendant from danger.” (Jury Instrs., p.25.) Subsection (1) does not have a
necessity requirement. Third, this instruction contains an objectively reasonable fear
requirement. (Jury Instrs., p.25.) Again, Subsection (1) does not have this requirement. See I.C.
§§ 18-4009, -4010; Hall, 161 Idaho at 418, 420 n.3. Fourth, the instruction requires that the
defendant act only in response to the objectively reasonable fear, (Jury Instrs., p.25), and again,
Subsection (1) lacks this requirement. See I.C. §§ 18-4009, -4010; Hall, 161 Idaho at 418.
Finally, the district court instructed the jury, “A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not
sufficient to justify a homicide.” (Jury Instrs., p.25.) As in the other inconsistencies outlined
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here, justifiable homicide under Subsection (1) is not precluded by a “bare fear.” See I.C. §§ 18-
4009, -4010; Hall, 161 Idaho at 418, 420 n.3.
Instruction No. 22 further compounded the harm caused by the district court’s failure to
instruct the jury on justifiable homicide under Subsection (1). Instruction No. 22 provided
additional guidance on the condition of an objectively reasonable fear and the use of force. Yet
again, I.C. § 18-4009(1) has no requirement that the individual act in an objectively reasonable
manner, using only the force a jury would think is allowable, in order for a homicide committed
in response to an actual, ongoing attack upon him to be justifiable. See I.C. §§ 18-4009, -4010;
Hall, 161 Idaho at 418, 420 n.3.
Finally, Instruction Nos. 20 and 21, read together, inform the jury to consider self-
defense pursuant to Subsection (3) only, despite the unexplained reference to Subsection (1) in
Instruction No. 20. Instruction No. 20 informed the jury that Mr. Godwin contended “the killing
was justifiable because the defendant was acting in self-defense.” (Jury Instrs., p.24 (emphasis
added).) The next sentence of Instruction No. 20 actually recited the law in I.C. § 18-4009(1).
But, this incomplete reference to Subsection (1) failed to instruct the jury that Subsection (1) was
an entirely separate scenario of justifiable homicide, distinct from self-defense. (Jury Instrs.,
p.24.) The general statement of the law on Subsection (1) did not instruct the jury that it could
also find Mr. Godwin not guilty based on Subsection (1) alone. Rather, this statement
erroneously informed the jury that Subsection (1) was part of the legal definition of self-defense.
The next instruction, No. 21, confirmed that the jury should consider self-defense only. It stated,
“A homicide is justifiable if the defendant was acting in self-defense.  In  order  to  find  that  the
defendant acted in self-defense, all of the following conditions must be found to have been in
existence at the time of the killing . . . .” (Jury Instrs., p.25 (emphasis added).) Instruction No. 21
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then went through the four conditions for the jury to find in order to find Mr. Godwin acted in
self-defense. (Jury Instrs., p.25.) Reading Instruction Nos. 20 and 21 together, the jury was
instructed to consider the justifiable homicide scenario of self-defense only, pursuant to
Subsection (3). The jury was not given any instructions to consider the conditions of Subsection
(1) to find Mr. Godwin not guilty for justifiable homicide due to an actual, ongoing attack.
In  sum,  these  instructions  informed  the  jury  on  the  law  and  conditions  to  find  that
Mr. Godwin acted in self-defense under Subsection (3). The jury was not adequately apprised of
the law of justifiable homicide pursuant to Subsection (1). Nor was it instructed that it could find
Mr. Godwin not guilty if he was resisting an actual, ongoing attack by Mr. Anderson, without
any consideration of objective reasonableness, “bare fear,” or the necessary and proper use of
force.
E. The  District  Court’s  Failure  To Instruct  The  Jury  On Justifiable  Homicide  Pursuant  To
I.C. § 18-4009(1) Was Fundamental Error
Mr. Godwin did not propose a separate justifiable homicide instruction at trial, and
therefore he must demonstrate fundamental error on appeal. Mr. Godwin has met this burden.
1. The Failure To Instruct The Jury On Justifiable Homicide Violated Mr. Godwin’s
Unwaived Constitutional Right To Due Process
A criminal defendant’s right to a fair  trial  is  protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
IDAHO CONST.  art.  1  §  13.  “The  requirement  that  the  State  prove  every  element  of  a  crime
beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process.” State v.
Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an element
of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process,
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State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743,
749 (2007); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); or as a
violation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee. Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277–78.
State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012). “A jury instruction that lightens the
prosecution’s burden of proof by shifting to the defendant the burden of persuasion on an
essential element, omitting an element of the crime, or creating a conclusive presumption as to
an element, is impermissible.” Crowe, 135 Idaho at 47.
“In charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for their
information.” Hall, 161 Idaho at 423 (quoting I.C. § 19-2132(a)).
In other words, a trial court must deliver instructions on the rules of law that are
material to the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. This
necessarily includes instructions on the “nature and elements of the crime charged
and the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been
admitted.
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “A
defendant in a criminal action is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury
under proper instructions. A defendant is entitled to an instruction where there is a reasonable
view of the evidence presented in the case that would support the theory.” Hall, 161 Idaho at
423. “It is not an error to give jury instructions that mirror the language of the statute related to
the crime.” Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 477 (citing Holland v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728 (1974)).
This Court has recognized the failure to properly instruct the jury on justifiable homicide
is an appropriate claim to raise as fundamental error. In Hall, this Court held the defendant did
not preserve his claim that the district court failed to instruct the jury on justifiable homicide
under Subsection (1). Hall, 161 Idaho 420–22. Due to the unpreserved claim, this Court held the
defendant “cannot assign as error the failure to instruct on subsection (1) of Idaho Code section
18-4009. The issue can only be raised as fundamental error.” Id. at 422. This Court then
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addressed the failure to give a Subsection (1) instruction under the fundamental error standard.
Id. at 422–25. This Court noted, “The first inquiry is whether there was an error in the jury
instruction.” Id. at 423 (quoting State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 227 (2014)). A reasonable
view of the evidence must support the instruction. Id. Ultimately, the Court held, “[T]here was
not a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the defense’s proposed instruction. Because
there  was  no  error  in  failing  to  give  the  instruction,  there  could  not  be  fundamental  error  with
respect to the failure to do so.” Id. at 425. Although the Hall Court rejected the defendant’s
fundamental  error  claim,  the Hall Court recognized the failure to provide the jury with the
justifiable homicide instruction under Subsection (1) could be raised as fundamental error.
Here, Mr. Godwin asserts his unwaived constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial
were violated by the district court’s failure to instruct the jury specifically on Subsection (1). In
order to prove Mr. Godwin committed second degree murder, the State had to prove Mr. Godwin
killed Mr. Anderson, acted without justification or excuse, and acted with malice aforethought.
I.C. §§ 18-4001, -4002. (Jury Instrs., pp.18–20.) These are all elements of the charged offense.
By failing to instruct the jury on Subsection (1) specifically, the State was relieved of its burden
to prove all element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsection (1) is an integral part
of justifiable homicide, and the jury must be instructed on all law relevant to its determination.
Without a Subsection (1) instruction, the jury could have found Mr. Godwin acted without legal
justification, even though Subsection (1), as a matter of law, establishes that the homicide was
justified. Moreover, unlike in Hall, a reasonable view of the evidence supported this instruction.
See Part IV.C.2. The jury did not have complete and accurate instructions on homicide, and the
instructions did not hold the State to its burden to prove the elements of second degree murder
beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the district court’s failure to properly instruct the jury on
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justifiable homicide violated Mr. Godwin’s constitutional right to due process and a fair trial.
2. The Error Is Obvious From The Record
This error with the jury instructions is clear from record. As discussed above, the four
separate scenarios of justifiable homicide in I.C. §§ 18-4009 and 18-4010 have been in effect in
Idaho since 1887. The statutes’ language is clear and unambiguous—justifiable homicide due to
an actual, ongoing attack (Subsection (1)) has entirely separate elements from justifiable
homicide due to self-defense (Subsection (3)). Both, independently of each other, create a legal
justification for homicide. I.C. § 18-4013. Moreover, this Court in Hall recently clarified and
confirmed these different scenarios of justifiable homicide. 161 Idaho at 418–25. In light of the
statute’s plain language and Hall, there is no dispute as to the propriety of a separate Subsection
(1)  instruction  when  supported  by  the  evidence,  as  is  the  case  here.  This  error  is  purely  a
question of law, and it is clear from the record that the evidence warranted this instruction.
Additionally, there is no legitimate tactical or strategic reason for trial counsel to fail to
request this instruction. This instruction would allow the jury to find Mr. Godwin not guilty due
to a lawful justification for Mr. Anderson’s death. The conditions for an actual, ongoing attack
pursuant to Subsection (1) are much less demanding than the conditions for self-defense in
Subsection (3), as outlined in Instruction Nos. 20 to 23. Mr. Godwin gained no tactical advantage
by failing to request this instruction. Essentially, without this instruction, the jury found
Mr. Godwin guilty without complete and accurate instructions on whether the homicide was
lawful. There is no basis to conclude trial counsel had knowledge of the inadequate instructions
and failed to object for some strategic reasons. Therefore, this error is obvious from the record.
3. The Error Is Not Harmless
Finally, the failure to instruct the jury on Subsection (1) of I.C. § 18-4009 is not harmless.
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To show the error prejudiced him, Mr. Godwin bears “the burden of proving there is a reasonable
possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
As discussed above, justifiable homicide under Subsection (1) and self-defense under
Subsection (3) contain entirely different elements. The jury may have rejected Mr. Godwin’s
self-defense claim because it did not find Mr. Godwin’s fear to be objectively reasonable, his
actions to be solely motivated by fear, or his actions to be reasonably necessary in response to
that fear. Any or all of these reasons could have defeated the jury finding Mr. Godwin acted in
self-defense. None of these hurdles are present in justifiable homicide pursuant to Subsection (1).
Mr. Godwin had to show only that he shot Mr. Anderson while resisting Mr. Anderson’s actual,
ongoing attack to kill or do great bodily harm. Based on the evidence presented, the jury could
have found Mr. Godwin’s shooting of Mr. Anderson was justifiable under Subsection (1), even if
his fear was unreasonable, his actions were not solely motivated by fear, and his actions were
more  than  necessary  to  respond  to  his  fear.  There  is  a  reasonable  possibility  that  this  error  in
failing to include the jury instruction on justifiable homicide pursuant to Subsection (1) affected
the outcome at trial. As such, Mr. Godwin has established fundamental error, and this Court
should vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
V.
The State Violated Mr. Godwin’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial
Misconduct
A. Introduction
Mr. Godwin asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which requires the
vacation of his conviction.
B. Standard Of Review
Because Mr. Godwin’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional
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principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006). Trial error ordinarily will not be addressed on appeal
unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861
(Ct. App. 2009). Mr. Godwin raises instances of un-objected to misconduct. The fundamental
error standard was articulated in Section IV(B) and is incorporated herein by reference.
C. The  State  Violated  Mr.  Godwin’s  Right  To  A  Fair  Trial  By  Committing  Prosecutorial
Misconduct
“[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a requirement and a
safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due process.’” Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802–03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Due process requires criminal
trials to be fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial
misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S.
756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must
be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Greer,
483 U.S. at 765.
1. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Vouching For The Evidence
Presented And State’s Witnesses
Closing argument “serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of
fact in a criminal case.” State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). “Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective
standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting State v.
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Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)). However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in
matters expressly stated and those implied. Id.
In closing argument, “both the prosecutor and defense counsel are entitled to discuss
fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom,”
and that this includes “the right to identify how, from the party’s perspective, the evidence
confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of particular witnesses.” State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho
160, 168 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). However, “it is improper for a prosecutor to express
a personal belief or opinion regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or as to
the guilt of the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). Closing argument should not include the
prosecutor’s personal opinions and beliefs about the credibility of a witness. Phillips, 144 Idaho
at 86.
In the case at hand, the prosecution repeatedly told the jury he personally believed in the
State’s case and the State’s witnesses were credible. The prosecution’s statements went much
further than the permissible bounds and encouraged the jury to rely on the prosecutor’s beliefs:
Now, Amanda Jones is not the most sophisticated witness, but I would
submit  to  you,  I  don’t  think  she  came off  as  a  schemer,  a  planner.  She  was  not
sophisticated, but I would submit to you and you judge her testimony. I would
submit  to  you  that  she  was  telling  the  truth, and that something you have to
decide, not me.
(Tr., p.1142, Ls.17–22 (emphasis added).)
Beau Lynch. . . . What motive does he have to lie? Judge his testimony.
He was scared. He was scared to sit up there and tell the truth about his former
boss, a friend. And I think he was scared, and I think he was nervous, but
even with all that, even with all that he still told the truth.  And  these
credibility questions are what you have to answer.
(Tr., p.1143, Ls.9–19 (emphasis added).)
. . . And Amanda Jones, she’s not a sophisticated witness, but I believe she was a
credible witness. Testimony from here was Mr. Goodwin, after he shoots and
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kills  Mr.  Anderson,  runs  up  to  here.  She’s  on  her  knees,  and  he’s  got  the  gun
pointed at her head. Why would she make that up? What incentive does she have
to say that? The shooting is over. Her boyfriend is dead. I mean, when you talk
about credibility, what reason does she have to lie about that?  I mean, it doesn’t
help – it doesn’t help the shooting incident. It’s something that happened to her
and  she’s  telling  you,  but  what  I’m  saying  is  if  someone  --  if  you  believe  that,
which I think was credible, it is totally inconsistent with self-defense, and these
are factors for you to consider.
(Tr., p.1145, L.13–p.1146, L.2 (emphasis added).)
. . . And I would submit that the evidence that the witnesses that the State put
on are credible, and, again, ladies and gentlemen, the State would ask you to find
Mr. Goodwin guilty of second degree murder.
(Tr., p.1177, L.15–19 (emphasis added).)
A prosecutor may commit misconduct by vouching during his closing arguments for the
credibility of the evidence he presented. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368 (Ct. App. 2010). A
prosecutor improperly vouches for evidence when he puts the prestige of the state behind that
evidence, expressing his personal opinions or beliefs about the quality of that evidence. Id.
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 provides, “A lawyer shall not . . . in trial . . . state
a  personal  opinion  as  to  .  .  .  the  credibility  of  a  witness  .  .  .  or  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  an
accused.” The rule applies to both the prosecuting attorney and to defense counsel. State v.
Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 721 (2011). With respect to due process, the United States Supreme
Court has explained why the prosecutor cannot vouch for a witness’s credibility or express a
personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt, stating:
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus
jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence.
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United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985).
In the case at hand, the State vouched for the credibility of two specific witnesses,
Amanda Jones and Beau Lynch, and interjected the prosecutor’s personal belief regarding the
credibility of the evidence numerous times during closing arguments. Admittedly, the
prosecution noted several times that credibility determinations had to be made by the jury.
However, despite these statements, the prosecution clearly intended to interject personal opinions
in an attempt to improperly influence the jury’s credibility determinations, encouraging the jury
to trust the State’s view of the evidence rather its own.
Mr. Godwin asserts the comments by the prosecution crossed the line and amounted to
more  than  a  fair  comment  on  the  evidence  or  inferences  to  be  drawn there  from.  Instead,  they
were attempts to bolster the credibility of Ms. Jones, Mr. Lynch, and the State’s case in general.
The closing, when reviewed in its entirety, was designed to inform the jury of the conclusions
that should be reached based upon the beliefs and conclusions of the prosecutor.
2. The Alleged Instances Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Are Reviewable As
Fundamental Error
Prosecutorial vouching for the credibility of a witness either through bolstering or
undermining credibility is not merely an evidentiary issue as it is when a witness provides
vouching testimony. Instead, it is a distinct form of prosecutorial misconduct that implicates a
constitutional right. It is a violation of Mr. Godwin’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial
to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the
law as explained in the jury instructions. As such, prosecutorial misconduct, in general, directly
violates a constitutional right. It should be noted the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Perry,
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in
the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that
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may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a
fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This is an implicit recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court
that prosecutorial misconduct claims are linked to a constitutional provision.
The State also violated Mr. Godwin’s right to a jury trial when the prosecutor attempted
to encroach upon the jury’s vital and exclusive function to weigh the evidence presented. The
State’s argument interfered with the jury’s ability to make an impartial decision by clouding the
issues through expressing personal beliefs about the strength of the State’s case and the truth of
Mr. Lynch and Ms. Jones’ testimony, thereby interfering with Mr. Godwin’s Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury. “The right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment . . .
includes the right to have the jury be ‘the sole judge of the weight of the testimony.’” State v.
Elmore, 228 P.3d 760, 765–66 (Wash. 2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 889 P.2d 929 (Wash. 1995)
(quoting State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250–51, 60 P. 403 (1900)).
The misconduct in this case violated both Mr. Godwin’s state and federal constitutional
rights to due process and federal and state constitutional rights to a jury trial. As such, the first
element of the fundamental error test has been met.
Additionally,  the  error  in  this  case  plainly  exists  from  the  record  and  no  additional
information is necessary. The record in this case suggests no reason to conclude that defense
counsel  elected,  as  a  matter  of  trial  strategy,  to  waive  any  objection  when  the  prosecution
committed numerous instance of misconduct. Further, it cannot be a tactical decision on the part
of the defense to have a jury reach a verdict, not based on the evidence and law, but based on
impermissible grounds presented through misconduct. As such, the second element of the
fundamental error test has been met.
Therefore, this misconduct is reviewable as fundamental error. Mr. Godwin then has the
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burden to prove that the error was not harmless. He asserts it was not.
3. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Requires Vacation Of The Conviction
In the case at hand, the prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the conviction
because it cannot be said that it did not affect the outcome of the trial. The prosecution bolstered
the credibility of Amanda Jones and Beau Lynch and bolstered the strength of its case through
the prosecutor’s expression of his personal beliefs. This misconduct encouraged the jury to
disregard their exclusive role as the judges of credibility in favor of the prosecutor’s beliefs. This
is a case that largely hinges on credibility. At the time of Mr. Anderson’s death, only a handful
individuals were present and able to observe the events that transpired: Mr. Anderson,
Ms.   Jones,  Mr.  Godwin,  Mr.  Lynch,  Mr.   Ruiz,  and  Ms.  Griner/Cutler.  The  deceased  and
Ms. Griner/Cutler did not testify at trial. As such, evidence of the events that transpired came in
through the three witnesses called by the State and Mr. Godwin. If Mr. Godwin’s account of the
events of the evening of Mr. Anderson’s death are accurate and credible, the killing of
Mr. Anderson was justifiable. However, if the account of other parties present was accurate or
credible, his actions were not justified and were criminal.
There were credibility issues which each of the witnesses. Ms. Jones openly lied during
her testimony. Shortly after the shooting of Mr. Anderson, Ms. Jones was asked to identify the
shooter. (Tr., p. 933, L.16–p.934, L.11.) She did not identify Mr. Godwin. However, during trial
she testified that she had identified Mr. Godwin. (Tr., p.614, Ls.1–9.) Officer Johnson testified
that Ms. Jones was unable to identify Mr. Godwin from the photo lineup. (Tr., p.934, Ls.9–15.)
As such, Ms. Jones’ statement to the contrary was false.
She also had issues recalling other events. When asked what Mr. Anderson had in his
hand when Mr. Godwin pulled up she noted “he had the license plate in his hand” (Tr., p.581,
Ls.12–14), he had a screwdriver in his hand (Tr., p.607, Ls.2–13), and that she “didn’t pay
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attention” (Tr., p.583, Ls.4–10). She was unable to remember what Mr. Godwin looks like, and
then, moments later, was able to identify him. (Tr., p.585, L.16–p.587, L.22.) Ms. Jones also
accused Mr. Ruiz of pointing a gun at her and threatening her. (Tr., p.608, L.4–p.610, L.7.)
Mr. Lynch testified at trial that he did not see Mr. Anderson pull a gun. (Tr., p.714, L.5–
p.715, L.2.) However, he told police that both Mr. Anderson and Mr. Godwin had guns drawn.
(Tr., p.724, L.13–p.725, L.15.)
Mr. Ruiz testified that he did not point a gun at Ms. Jones. (Tr., p.787, L.17–p.788, L.3.)
As such, either Ms. Jones or Mr. Ruiz is correct about that specific event, but one of the two was
lying.
Certainly, Mr. Godwin’s early statements to investigators were not accurate. He openly
acknowledged that when he first began talking to police he lied about his whereabouts and
involvement in the death of Mr. Anderson. (Tr., p.1075, Ls.9–12, p.1082, L.5–p.1084, L.7.)
However, shortly into the interrogation, Mr. Godwin admitted involvement and asserted the
killing was self–defense. (Tr., p.1063, L.6–p.1064, L.18, p.1111. Ls.3–20; State’s Exs. 68, 69.)
He maintains that the homicide was justified.
As such, there were numerous inconsistencies and outright lies in the eye-witness
testimony. Determining who to believe was the jury’s most vital decision. The prosecutor’s
repeated comments that he,  a representative of the State of Idaho, believed in the case and the
testimony of Ms. Jones and Mr. Lynch likely impacted the way the jury made its credibility
determinations and, as a result, likely affected the outcome of the trial.
Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct could have influenced the way the jury
considered the evidence, made credibility determinations, and rendered their verdict. This Court
should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Godwin of his right to a fair trial because it cannot
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say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not contribute to the verdict. In reviewing the
trial as a whole, the prosecutor’s improper comments, constituting misconduct, likely influenced
the jury. This Court must vacate the conviction.
VI.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Godwin’s Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived
Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr.  Godwin  asserts  if  the  Court  finds  that  the  above  errors  were  harmless,  the  district
court’s errors combined amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine refers to an
accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated,
show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant’s constitutional right to due
process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). In order to find cumulative error,
this Court must first conclude there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then
conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Lovelass,
133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under that doctrine, even when individual errors are
deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair trial. State v.
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994). However, a finding of cumulative error must be predicated
upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Godwin asserts the district court’s errors amounted to actual errors depriving him of
a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are found in Parts I–IV above, and need not
be repeated, but are incorporated herein by reference.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Godwin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this
case for a new trial.
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